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Abstract
This Article assesses the wisdom of the substantive laws enacted in the wake of 9/11 and the
procedures set up to combat this enemy. This Article is divided into four parts. Part I evaluates
the doctrinal debate relating to the definition of terror, terrorism and terrorists. More particularly,
it attemps to demonstrate the difficulty in identify the “terrorist” that needs to be excluded, and
how that definition affects the immigration laws. Part II sets the stage for a comparative analysis
by briefly surverying the terrorism-related immigration laws and procedures of each jurisdiction
to this study. Part III provides a detailed comparative analysis of the most important substantive
and procedural laws of the four jurisdictions. Part IV identifies a model approach that combines
the best practices of all four jurisdictions.

THE TERRORISM BAR TO ASYLUM IN
AUSTRALIA, CANADA, THE UNITED KINGDOM,
AND THE UNITED STATES: TRANSPORTING
BEST PRACTICES
Won Kidane*
INTRODUCTION
The contemporary threat of terrorism1 that the Western
world 2 faces is primarily from so-called "aliens."3 As such, the laws
that are meant to combat terrorism necessarily involve the
regulation of the admission and exclusion of aliens. This type of

* Assistant Professor of Law, Seattle University School of Law.

1. The concept of terrorism has eluded social scientists and the international legal
community for centuries. It has been understood either in the context of the state's
control and arbitrary use of coercive power, or as violence perpetrated by nonstate
actors. "Contemporary" is used to show that this Article's inquiry is limited to the latter
phenomenon: terrorism as perpetrated by nonstate actors. For a recent discussion of the
concepts of terrorism as state-sponsored action or freelance nonstate actors, see BEN
SAUL, DEFINING TERRORISM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1-7 (2006).

2. "Western world," which may have many different meanings and usages, is used
here in its most common sense to signify the cultures, territories, and peoples of
Australia, Europe, and North America.
3. The term "alien" is obviously controversial. The main concern, as Professors
Legomsky and Rodriguez suggest, is the possibility of needless reinforcement of an
outsider and inferior status that repeated use might perpetuate. See STEPHEN H.
LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRIGUEZ, IMMIGRATION LAW AND REFUGEE POLICY 1 (5th
ed. 2009) (citing Kevin R. Johnson, Aliens and the US. Immigration Laws: Social and Legal
Construction of Nonpersons, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 263 (1997)). However, this
Article uses the term not only because it still has a specific statutory meaning in the
United States, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (2006) (defining "alien" as "any person not a
citizen or national of the United States"), but also because the term itself captures the
underlying assumption behind the regulation of immigration-how "we" stop "them"
from coming (technical term "exclusion"), or how "we" send "them" to their counties
of origin (technical term "deportation" or "removal"). See David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54
STAN. L. REv. 953, 989 (2002) (dating the inferior treatment of foreigners in the United
States to the Alien and Sedition Acts in 1789 (citing JAMES MORTON SMITH, FREEDOM'S
FETTERS: THE ALIEN AND SEDITION LAWS AND AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES 12-49 (1956))).
Notably, the United States is the only one of the four jurisdictions included in this study
that uses the term alien. Hopefully, the United States will some time replace this
pejorative term with a more agreeable one.
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regulation is traditionally the purview of immigration law. 4
Although the link between national security and immigration is
by no means contemporary, the existing level of intersection
between antiterrorism laws and immigration is essentially a post9/11 phenomenon. 5 The reason for this phenomenon is that the
9/11 attacks were planned and executed by aliens. 6 Although
there has not been a terrorist attack on U.S. soil since 9/11,
Europe and other parts of the world have since suffered several
prominent attacks by persons viewed as aliens, 7 which has fueled
the characterization of alienage as the most essential ingredient
of terrorism.
After the 9/11 attacks, lawmakers from Australia, Canada,
the United Kingdom, and the United States faced three possible
alternatives for regulating the admission and exclusion of aliens:
two extreme positions and a moderate middle option. The

4. Immigration law refers to the legal rules that govern the admission and
expulsion of foreign nationals. E.g., Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century
of Plenary Power: Phantom ConstitutionalNorms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE LJ.
545, 547 (1990) (defining immigration law as the body of law concerning the admission
and expulsion of aliens, as opposed to the more general rights and obligations held by
aliens). The source of immigration law in the United States is the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537 (2006 & Supp. 2008)). In the United Kingdom, the principal
immigration law is the Immigration Act, 1971, c. 77, as amended by several subsequent
acts over the years and most recently by the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act,
2006, c. 13. All of the United Kingdom's immigration laws are compiled in MARGARET
PHELAN &JAMES GILLESPIE, IMMIGRATION LAW HANDBOOK (5th ed. 2007). The principal

Canadian immigration law of most current importance is the Immigration and Refugee
Protection Act, 2001 S.C., ch. 27. It amends and consolidates all preexisting laws. The
main Australian immigration law is the Migration Act, 1958, No. 62, as amended several
times over the years.
5. See Andrew I. Schoenholtz, Anti-Terrorism Laws and the Legal Framework for
InternationalMigration, in INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION LAW: DEVELOPING PARADIGMS AND

KEY CHALLENGES 3-5 (Ryszad Cholewinski et al. eds., 2007).
6. See NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11
COMMISSION REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST
ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES 215-53 (2004) [hereinafter 9/11 COMM'N REPORT]

(detailing the identity of the terrorists who carried out the 9/11 attacks).
7. The most notable include the October 12, 2002, Bali, Indonesia, bombing,
which killed 202 people and wounded over 300, e.g.,John Crewdson, 2 Firms Linked to Al
Qaeda, Saudi Intelligence Agency, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 31, 2004, at Al, the March 11, 2004,
Madrid bombing, which killed 191 people and wounded 1800, e.g., Keith B. Richburg,
Spain Arrests Another in Train Bombings, WASH. POST, Apr. 6, 2004, at A14, and the July 7,
2005, London bombing, which killed fifty-two people and injured hundreds, e.g.,
Damien Francis, London Bombing Victims Remembered, GUARDIAN (London), July 8, 2008,
at 11.
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position at one extreme was a total ban on the admission of
aliens. None of these jurisdictions opted for this choice because
it would have resulted in a total cessation in world trade. The
position at the other extreme was to continue the usual practice
of alien admission as though the 9/11 attacks never occurred.
Again, none of the jurisdictions in this study exercised that
option, mainly because it would almost certainly have
jeopardized their security. Instead, they all opted for some
compromise of the two extremes: admitting noncitizen foreign
nationals as needed by attempting to exclude aliens with terrorist
ties. To confront the new and real threat posed by terrorism,
each of these four jurisdictions amended their immigration laws
and set up new procedures.8 In the process, however, their
substantive laws and procedures largely neglected, to varying
degrees, fundamental notions of proportionality and justice. This
Article attempts to measure the degree of deviation from the
notions of proportionality and substantial fairness by critically
examining the approaches taken by the four jurisdictions, and
then advances a model approach that strikes the appropriate
balance between fairness, increasing the administrability of
immigration laws, maximizing the benefits of cross-border
mobility, and minimizing the exposure to risks of future terrorist
attacks.
In its comprehensive
report, the bipartisan 9/11
Commission characterized the enemy as "sophisticated, patient,
disciplined, and lethal."9 It also noted that the government
institutions entrusted with the task of protecting the boarders,
including the national security agencies, failed to appreciate the
gravity of the threat and adjust their policies to combat it.10 The
report further indicated that U.S. government institutions were
built in a different era to deal with different kinds of threats, and
urged modifying the current system in order to deal with the new
type of enemy.11 The commission hoped that the United States
12
would be "safer, stronger and wiser" as a result of the attacks.
The inclusion of "wiser" is obviously deliberate and seems to be

8. See infta Part II.
9. 9/11 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 6, at xvi.
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See id.
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an essential aspect of overcoming the challenges. Accordingly,
this Article assesses the wisdom of the substantive laws enacted in
the wake of 9/11 and the procedures set up to combat this
enemy. Although the commission's report did not fully cover
particular threats to other nations, the basic message seems to be
equally valid as it applies to all of the four jurisdictions included
in this study. Predicated on the outcome of such evaluations, this
Article suggests a means of striking the proper balance between
national security and the maintenance of open, tolerant, and
progressive societies.
This Article is divided into four parts. Part I evaluates the
doctrinal debate relating to the definition of terror, terrorism
and terrorists. More particularly, it attempts to demonstrate the
difficulty in identifying the "terrorist" that needs to be excluded,
and how that definition affects the immigration laws. Part II sets
the stage for a comparative analysis by briefly surveying the
terrorism-related immigration laws and procedures of each
jurisdiction in this study. Part III provides a detailed comparative
analysis of the most important substantive and procedural laws of
the four jurisdictions. Part IV identifies a model approach that
combines the best practices of all of four jurisdictions.
I.

WHO IS A TERRORIST?

Nearly ten thousand books have been published around the
world containing "terrorism," "terror," or "terrorist" in their
titles between September 11, 2001, and the middle of 2008.13
Professor Dipak Gupta analogizes the intense study of the subject
to the man in the Tolstoy short story who looked at the sun for so
long that he lost his sight and concluded that, after all, the sun
never existed because he could see it no longer. 14 Professor
Gupta's observation is quite interesting because, as of yet, it has
proven impossible to agree on the meaning of the terms
"terrorism" or "terrorist" at the international level. 15 At the
6
center of this confusion is a fundamental doctrinal dilemma.'

13. DIPAK K_ GUPTA, UNDERSTANDING

TERRORISM AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE 3

(2008).
14. See id. at 6-7.
15. See id. at 7-8.
16. The Encyclopedia of World Terrorism begins with this introduction:
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This Part examines this dilemma, surveys the various
international definitions, highlights the major problems in
settling on one definition, and identifies the appropriate
international standards for defining the term. Consequently, this
Part provides a background for a discussion of the definitions
used by the four jurisdictions.
A.

DoctrinalDilemma

The ordinary meaning of the term "terrorism" could be
extremely broad. Any kind of violence or the threat of violence
no matter how insignificant may have the potential of terrorizing
human beings depending on the circumstances. 17 However, in
this era, this term carries with it significant legal and political
consequences. The meaning depends on who defines it. There is
no real disagreement in the Western World on whether
Mohammed Atta was a terrorist. 8 But the concept is far more
elusive than an analogy.
An excellent example displaying the doctrinal dilemma in
defining terrorism is the situation of former South African
President and Nobel Peace Prize winner Nelson Mandela.
Although, for a great majority of South Africans and other
groups, he was both a freedom fighter and great leader, others
considered him to be a terrorist. In fact, as recent as June 2008
he was deemed inadmissible into the United States for his role as
a member and leader of the African National Congress

Terrorism is a phenomenon that affects many people in the modem world.
Terrorists' targeting of innocent victims in order to influence some other
group such as a government means that nobody can be totally assured that the
shadow of terrorist violence will never darken their lives. However, given that
one person's terrorist is another person's freedom fighter, what precisely is
terrorism? Are covert state-sponsored death squads eliminating political
enemies any less terrorists than a revolutionary group assassinating police
chiefs? The complexity of what precisely is terrorism must be addressed before
the campaigns of modem terrorist can be explored.
I ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WORLD TERRORISM 9 (Martha Crenshaw &John Pimlott eds., 1997).
17. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, A Policy Oriented Inquiry into the Different Forms and
Manifestations of "International Terrorism," in LEGAL RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL
TERRORISM: U.S. PROCEDURAL ASPECTS xv, xv (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1988) (positing
that "every form of violence is potentially terror-inspiring to its victim").
18. For detailed description of Mohammed Atta and his ties to the 9/11 attacks, see
Richard Bernstein, On Plotters' Path to U.S., A Stop at bin Laden Camp, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
10, 2002, at Al.
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("ANC").19 He was formally removed from the U.S. immigration
20
watch list for his ninetieth birthday.
Two examples from the New York Times and USA Today
blogospheres at the time of Mandela's ninetieth birthday offer an
insightful cross-section of the debate as among ordinary people.
One man painted Mandela as having "the blood of thousands of
innocent lifes [sic] on his hands." 21 This poster depicted
Mandela's role as the leader of the ANC, and many of the
22
horrendous acts of violence carried out by that organization.
He commented that contrary views on Mandela display "the
ignorance of the human race" and come from persons "that pass
comment on people, organisations and countries that they know
little to nothing about." 23 An excellent representation of the
opposing view is stated by Nicholas Kristof of the New York
Times. He opines that "of all the ridiculous things [the United
States] did in the name of protecting American security, putting
Nelson Mandela on a terrorism watch list may be the most
absurd." Kristof went on to describe Mandela as "the symbol of
24
peaceful conciliation," and a "90-year-old hero."
It is easy to dismiss the opinion of the USA Today blogger as
arrogant, insensitive, or even ill-conceived. However, it is an
excellent representation of one side of the debate. The
fundamental question boils down to this: should involvement in
violent resistance of any kind be considered a prima facie
evidence of terrorism? There is no easy answer to this question.
Nelson Mandela was in fact the one who proposed that the
ANC abandon its course of nonviolence-which he said failed to
19. See Mimi Hall, Mandela Is On U.S. Terrorist Watch List, USA TODAY, May 1, 2008,
at A2.
20. See Law Removes Mandela from U.S. Watch List, July 2, 2008, WALL ST. J., at A2
(quoting then-U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff on the Mandela
case, "[i]t raises a troubling and difficult debate about what groups are considered
terrorists and which are not").
21. Comment of TimJeanes to Mimi Hall, supra note 19.
22. See Comment of Tim Jeanes to Mimi Hall, supra note 19 (citing the use of
training camps, Limpet Mines, and car bombs, and rhetorically closing "shall I go on?").
23. Id.
24. On the Ground, http://kristof.blogs.nytimes.com/ (July 1, 2008, 17:08 EST).
Individual states' terrorist lists may contain such persons as climate campaigners. See,
e.g.,
Posting of Andrew C. Revkin to DOT EARTH, http://dotearth.blogs.nytimes.com/
2008/10/23/climate-campaigners-on-terrorist-list/
(Oct. 23, 2008, 10:37 EST)
(reporting that some members of an environmental group were listed on Maryland's
terrorist list).
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work for fifty years-and formed the first ever military wing of
the ANC. 25 His very own description of the debate with the other
leaders on whether to use violence best illustrates the dilemma.
Mandela recalls a June 1961 ANC leadership meeting during
which the leadership discussed nonviolence. 26 Mandela
recounted,
At the meeting I argued that the state had given us no
alternative to violence. I said it was wrong and immoral to
subject our people to armed attacks by the state without
offering them some kind of alternative. I mentioned again
that people on their own had taken up arms. Violence would
begin whether we initiated it or not .... 27
Mandela was then assigned to form and lead the armed branch
of the ANC, best known by its acronym MK 28 This group had to
consider the way in which it would use force. In his own words:
[W]e considered four types of violent activities: sabotage,
guerrilla warfare, terrorism, and open revolution. For a small
and fledgling army, open revolution was inconceivable.
Terrorism inevitably reflected poorly on those who used it,
undermining any public support it might otherwise garner.
Guerrilla warfare was a possibility, but since the ANC had
been reluctant to embrace violence at all, it made sense to
start with the form of violence that inflicted least harm
29
against individuals: sabotage.
In the early morning hours of a December morning, the MK
detonated homemade bombs at electric power stations and
government offices in Johannesburg, Port Elizabeth, and
Durban.3 0 Mandela describes the group's choice to initiate attack
that morning, "Afrikaners celebrate December 16 as the triumph
of the Afrikaner over the African and the demonstration that
God was on their side," but goes on to conclude, "We chose
December 16 to show that the African had only begun to fight,
31
and that we had righteousness-and dynamite-on our side."
For Mandela, deploying dynamite in aid of righteousness was
25. NELSON MANDELA, LONG WALK To FREEDOM 238-39 (1994).

26. Id. at 236.

27. Id. at 237.
28. See id&at 239.

29. Id. at 246.
30. See id. at 248.

31. Id. at 249.
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justified. For the apartheid regime, it was obviously outright
terrorism.
Professor Gupta adds an interesting perspective from the
Indian anticolonial struggle. He begins his story by saying, "I
come from a long line of terrorists and their adversaries." 32 The
relatives that he calls terrorists include his uncle who fought
against the colonial forces using whatever they could find,
including bamboo sticks. 33 The relatives that he calls the
adversaries of the terrorists include those who served the colonial
forces in different capacities including as prosecutors,
magistrates, police officers, and others. 34 Professor Gupta's
paternal grandfather was a "terrorist" who fought the British but
his maternal grandfather was a judge who "no doubt[] handed
'3 5
down sentences to the likes of [his] paternal grandfather."
Gupta's maternal grandfather no doubt considered Gupta's
paternal grandfather a terrorist because he was engaged in the
violent resistance of colonial rule. The paternal grandfather no
doubt considered himself a freedom fighter, and the violence as
a legitimate self-defense. Again, the essential question remains
unanswered.
The general rule of international law relating to the use of
force by states is enshrined in the United Nations ("U.N.")
Charter. Article 2(4) of the charter prohibits the use of force by
states. 36 The exception to this rule allows states to resort to force
in the exercise of their inherent right of individual or collective
self-defense.3 7 The question of whether nonstate actors,
particularly individuals or resistance movements, have the same
right of self-defense is a difficult one.
One of the leading authorities on international criminal law,
Professor Antonio Cassese, who served on the appellate chamber
of the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia, remarks
that the right to self-defense only applies to states under
international law and is inoperative between groups and

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

GUPTA, supra note 13, at xiv.
See id
See id.
Id. at vix-vx.
U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
See id. art. 51.
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individuals.3 8 He reasons that individuals and organized armed
groups are without this protection because this policy judgment
is left to the national legal system of each state.39 As a result, it is
entirely unsurprising that most countries do not legitimize resort
to armed violence "given the threat this would pose to their own
authority." 40 Professor Cassese does observe, however, that
organized armed groups are permitted to use force against a
government in order to "resist the forcible denial of selfdetermination by (1) a colonial state, (2) an occupying power, or
(3) a state refusing a racial group equal access to government"
but not because these situations are considered ones of "self41
defence" under international law.
David Kopel, Paul Gallant, and Joanne Eisen of the
Independence Institute provide an interesting commentary to
this opinion. The commentary highlights the existing debate and
in a way the doctrinal dilemma in defining terrorism. They argue
that, under Cassese's definition, a great many number of victims
would be entirely helpless to guard against genocide by an
oppressive regime. 42 In short, "to deny the individual, inherent,
and universal right of self-defense is to eliminate the right to
resist genocide, ethnic cleansing, rape, and every other
atrocity." 43 In support of their argument, they cite to numerous
persuasive authorities, most notably Grotius, who relying on
philosopher Thomas Aquinas noted, "defensive violence is based
on the intention of self-preservation, not the purpose of killing
another."44
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Far East, in In
re Hirota, observed: "Any law, international or municipal, which
prohibits recourse to force, is necessarily limited by the right to

38. See SMALL ARMS SURVEY 2004: RIGHTS AT RISK 181 (2005) (quoting Antonio
Cassese, The Various Aspects of Self-Defense Under InternationalLaw, in SMALL ARMS SURVEY
2003: DEVELOPMENT DENIED (2004)).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See David B. Kopel et al., The Human Rights of Self-Defense, 22 BYUJ. PUB. L.43,
157-58 (2007) (citing to the genocides in Nazi Germany, Cambodia, Rwanda, and
Darfur as examples that would not be covered under Cassese's definition).
43. Id. at 159.
44. Id. at 77 (paraphrasing 2 HUGo GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE 398
(Richard Tuck ed., Library Fund 2005) (1625).
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self-defense." 45 According to Grotius self-defense against tyranny
has the same justifications as self-defense against a lone
criminal. 46 The domestic laws of some nations provide citizens
with the right and duty to violently resist tyranny whether it is
47
foreign or domestic.
Although the use of violence between states is credibly
proscribed by way of the U.N. Charter,48 the status of the use of
violence within a sovereign jurisdiction remains elusive,
particularly in light of the principle of noninterference. 49 The
significant expansion seen in the field of human rights and
fundamental freedoms has complicated the inquiry even further
as far as the use of violence within the domestic arena is
concerned. Perhaps the most important human rights principle
relevant to this inquiry is the right to self determination

45. 15 Ann. Dig. & Rep. of Pub. Int'l L. Cases 356, 364 (Int'l Mil. Trib. for the Far
East, 1948), see YORAm DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION, AND SELF-DEFENSE 181 (2d ed.
1994) ("This postulate [from Hirota] may have always been true in regard to domestic
law, and it is currently accurate also in respect of international law .... [T]he right of
self-defence will never be abolished in the relations between flesh-and-blood human
beings. ... ").
46. Kopel et al., supra note 41, at 142.
47. See id. (citing the constitutions of Andorra, Argentina, Congo, Greece,
Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, Lithuania, Mauritania, Peru, Portugal, Romania, and
Slovakia). In particular, the constitution of Argentina provides:
This constitution shall rule when its observance is interrupted by acts of force
against the institutional order and the democratic system. These acts shall be
irreparably null .... "Those who ... were to assume the powers foreseen for
the authorities of this constitution . .. shall be punished... and shall be civil
and criminally liable for their acts .... All citizens shall have the right to
oppose resistance to those committing the acts of force stated in this section.
CONST ARG. § 36, Boletfn Oficial, 10 de Enero de 1995, translated in 1 CONSTITUTIONS
OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 7 (Gisbert H. Flanz ed., 1999). An English translation
of the Argentine constitution is also available at http://www.argentina.gov.ar/
argentina/portal/documentos/constitucion-ingles.pdf. The constitution of Greece
provides: "Observance of the Constitution is entrusted to the patriotism of the Greeks
who shall have the right and the duty to resist by all possible means against anyone who
attempts the violent abolition of the Constitution." 1975 Syntagma [Constitution], art.
120(4), Ephemeris tes Kyvernesos tes Hellenikes Demokratias 1986, A:23, translated in 7
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, supra, at 15. An English translation
of the Greek constitution is also available at http://www.ministryofjustice.gr/eu2003/
constitution.pdf. For the constitutions of several U.S. states, see Kopel et al., supra note
41, at 102 n.314. For instance, the Colorado constitution provides: "All persons have
certain natural, essential and inalienable rights, among which may be reckoned the right
of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties. .. ." COLO. CONST. art. 2, § 3.
48. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
49. See id. art. 2, para. 7.
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protected in, among other instruments, the U.N. Charter, 50 the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 5 1 and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights. 52 There is no doubt that this right now exists under
customary international law. 53 In the context of self-defense or

the resort to violence for purposes of self-determination, the
guiding international law is found in First Protocol to the Geneva
Conventions. 54 The protocol recognizes the legitimacy of
"peoples [who] are fighting against colonial domination and
alien occupation, and against racist regimes in the exercise of
their right to self-determination, as enshrined in the Charter of
55
the United Nations."
Whether this right extends to resistance movements
opposing tyranny where there is no racially based oppression or
alien domination continues to be a subject of great controversy.
The United Nations has completely avoided answering the
question. 56 That means the doctrinal dilemma remains
50. See id. art. 1, para 2 ("To develop friendly relations among nations based on
respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take
other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace.").
51. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 1, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 ("All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right
they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and
cultural development.").
52. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 1, Dec.
16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 ("All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of
that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic,
social and cultural development.").
53. See, e.g., IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 513 (4th

ed. 1991) ("Other rules which probably have this special status include the principle of
permanent sovereignty over natural resources and the principle of self-determination.");
ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A DIVIDED WORD 163 (1986) (discussing the

rise of the right of self-determination under international law); JAMES CRAWFORD, THE
RIGHTS OF PEOPLES 160-63 (1988) (same).
54. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict (Protocol 1) art. 1 (4), Dec. 7,
1979, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.
55. Id.
56. See The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-Generalon the Question of SelfDetermination, 15, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/63/254 (Aug. 8, 2008)
("In its concluding observations on the Sudan adopted on 26 July 2007, the Human
Rights Committee noted the efforts made by the State party on the issue of selfdetermination in Southern Sudan, in particular article 222 of the Interim National
Constitution, which provides for a referendum on self-determination. The Committee
regretted the lack of information from the State party concerning the human rights
situation in Southern Sudan ..
"),
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unresolved, which in turn makes a comprehensive and workable
definition of terrorism almost impossible.
B.

InternationalLegal Definition:Identifying the Standards

Examination of the modern attempt to define terrorism
properly begins with a look at the definition of terrorism
contained in the Terrorism Convention of 1937, 57 which was
prompted by the assassination of King Alexander I of Yugoslavia
and the French Minister of Foreign Affairs in Marseilles, France,
on October 9, 1934.58 The convention did not directly define
terrorism, but identified some acts that the contracting states
considered terrorist acts, including "any willful act causing death
or grievous bodily harm or loss of liberty to... Heads of
States," 59 along with any "willful destruction of, or damage to,
public property," 60 or "willful act calculated to endanger the lives
of members of the public." 61 It also criminalized all related
inchoate offenses. 62 The convention attracted no attention at all.
63
Only India ratified it, and, it therefore never entered into force.
However, as will be discussed, this first attempt identified some of
the basic elements that underpin contemporary efforts to define
terrorism.
One of the first and most notable international conferences
on terrorism was held in 1973 at the International Institute of
Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences at Siracusa. 64 In that
conference, Professor Bassiouni used the phrase, "what is
terrorism to some is heroism to others." 65 It has since become a

57. Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, Nov. 16, 1937, 19
L.N.O.J. 23.
58. ELIZABETH

CHADWICK,

SELF-DETERMINATION,

TERRORISM

AND

THE

INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 97 (1996).
59. Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, supra note 57,
art. 2(1)(a).
60. Id. art. 2(2).
61. Id. art. 2(3).
62. Id. arts 2(4)-(5).
63. See CHADWICK, supranote 58, at 97.
64. See BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND POLITICAL CRIMES ix (1974).

65. Bassiouni, supra note 17, at xxi. The same ideology is embodied in the old
Greek saying that "no victim is more agreeable to god than the blood of a tyrant."
Ninian Stephen, Toward a Definition of Terrorism, in TERRORISM AND JUSTICE: MORAL
ARGUMENT IN A THREATENED WORLD 1, 2 (Tony Coady & Michael O'Keefe eds., 2003)

(paraphrasing the Roman philosopher and playwright Lucius Annaeus Seneca).
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commonly used maxim. 66 The underlying assumption raises the
same question of justifiability that was discussed in the previous
section. Professor Bassiouni suggests that the ambiguity is in fact
desirable for some governments that do not necessarily share
common values and goals. 67 Based on that premise, he proposed
perhaps one of the most widely accepted definitions of terrorism
using norms of international law as a parameter. According to
him, terrorism may be defined as
an ideologically-motivated strategy of internationally
proscribed violence designed to inspire terror within a
particular segment of a given society in order to achieve a
power-outcome or to propagandize a claim or grievance
irrespective of whether its perpetrators are acting for and on
68
behalf of themselves or on behalf of a state.
This definition narrows the scope by including a motive
element linked to ideology, and limits the nature of the violence
to internationally proscribed conduct. Professor Bassiouni had in
mind anyone who commits these acts whether that person acts
alone, as a member of an organization, or is a government
official. 69 Although almost all international attempts to define
terrorism since then have failed for some of the problems
indicated in the previous section, 70 Professor Bassiouni's use of
66. Some cite to this maxim with approval, while others dislike the expression.
Compare GUPTA, supra note 13, at xvii ("The old adage 'one man's terrorist is another
man's freedom fighter' is indeed true. It is imperative to remember... how we describe
a certain event has a lot to do with how we choose to deal with it."), with WAYNE
MCCORMACK, UNDERSTANDING THE LAW OF TERRORISM 19 (2007) ("[T]his [expression]
is an almost silly argument because universal law criminalizes attacks on civilian
populations without regard to political motivations of the actor. The difficulty is not
whether there could be justification for an attack on civilians because legally there
cannot be. The difficulty is in determining by what process to respond to such attack.").
McCormack seems to assume that Bassiouni's usage of the word "hero" in the maxim
includes even those who use violence against civilians. See MCCORMACK, supra,at 19.
67. Bassiouni, supra note 17, at xxi-xxii.
68. Id. at xxiii.
69. See id.
70. See supra note 67 and accompanying text; see also U.N. Ad Hoc Comm. on
Terrorism, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee Establishedby General Assembly Resolution 51/210
of 17 December 1996, 5, U.N. Doc. A/62/37 (Feb. 15, 2007) ("Some other delegations
emphasized the importance of including ...a legal definition of terrorism to distinguish
it from the legitimate struggle of peoples for self-determination. In addition, other
delegates expressed the view that State terrorism would have to be included in any
comprehensive convention on international terrorism. It was reiterated that acts of state
terrorism were of serious concern to the international community and that such acts
only contributed to a vicious cycle of terrorism."); MCCORMACK, supra note 66, at 20

2010]

THE TERRORISM BAR TO ASYLUM

313

international legal norms as the basic standard steadily gained
acceptance. In the decades that followed, although the
international community avoided a strict definition of terrorism,
it took "a pragmatic, empirical, problem-oriented, step-by-step"
definition of conduct considered terrorist activity. 71 Evidence of
this problem-oriented, step-by-step approach can be found in the
72
more than a dozen international treaties.
Of all these instruments, however, the International
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism is
the only one that contains a provision that may be construed as a
definition of terrorism. 73 It states:
1. Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this
Convention if that person by any means, directly or
indirectly, unlawfully and willfully, provides or collects funds
with the intention that they should be used or in the

("The major problems are in determining whether terrorism encompasses only nonstate
actors and whether to exempt actions against oppressive regimes.").
71. SAUL, supra note 1, at 133 (citing ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW 123 n.5 (2003)). An older study identified about 109 such different national and
international definitions of terrorism. Id. at 57 (citing ALEX P. SCHMID & A.J. JONGMAN,
POLITICAL TERRORISM 119-52 (1983)).
72. See, e.g., International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear
Terrorism, G.A. Res. 59/290, U.N. Doc. A/RES/59/290 (Apr. 13, 2005); International
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, Dec. 9, 1999, S. TREATY
DOc. No. 106-49, 2178 U.N.T.S. 229; International Convention for the Suppression of
Terrorist Bombings, Dec. 15, 1998, S. TREATY DOc. No. 106-6, 2149 U.N.T.S. 256;
Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, Mar. 1,
1991, S. TREATY Doc. No. 103-8, 2122 U.N.T.S. 374; Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, Mar. 10, 1988, S. TREATY DOc.
No. 101-1, 1678 U.N.T.S. 221; Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the
Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, Mar. 10, 1988, S. TREATY
DOc. NO. 101-1, 1678 U.N.T.S. 304; Protocol on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of
Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, Feb. 24, 1988, S. TREATY DOc.
No. 100-19, 1589 U.N.T.S. 474; Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear
Material, Mar. 3, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11,080, 1456 U.N.T.S. 124; International Convention
Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, T.I.A.S. No. 11,081, 1316 U.NT.S. 205;
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally
Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, 1035
U.N.T.S. 167; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565, 974 U.N.T.S. 177; Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, 860 U.N.T.S.
105; Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed On Board Aircraft,
Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, 704 U.N.T.S. 219.
73. Professor McCormack uses the term "resembles a definition." See MCCORMACK,
supra note 66, at 21.
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knowledge that they are to be used, in full or in part, in
order to carry out:
(b) Any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily
injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an
active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict,
when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to
intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an
internationalorganizationto do or to abstainfrom doing any
74

act.

This definition of terrorism is the closest to an international
consensus yet to be achieved. Adopted in New York on December
77
76
9, 1999, it has 171 state parties. 75 All four of Australia, Canada
78
79
the United Kingdom, and the United States, have ratified this
treaty and have even enacted implementing legislation that

74. International Convention for the Suppression of Financing of the Financing of
Terrorism, supra note 72, art. 2(1) (emphasis added). The treaty also criminalizes
inchoate offenses:
3. For an act to constitute an offence set forth in paragraph 1, it shall not be
necessary that the funds were actually used to carry out an offence referred to
in paragraph 1,subparagraphs (a) or (b).
4. Any person also commits an offence if that person attempts to commit an
offence as set forth in paragraph 1 of this article.
5. Any person also commits an offence if that person:
(a) Participates as an accomplice in an offence as set forth in paragraph I
or 4 of this article;
(b) Organizes or directs others to commit an offence as set forth in
paragraph 1 or 4 of this article;
(c) Contributes to the commission of one or more offences as set forth in
paragraphs 1 or 4 of this article by a group of persons acting with a
common purpose. Such contribution shall be intentional and shall either:
(i) Be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or
criminal purpose of the group, where such activity or purpose
involves the commission of an offence as set forth in paragraph 1 of
this article; or
(ii) Be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to
commit an offence as set forth in paragraph 1 of this article.
Id. arts. 3-5.
75. See Status of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing
of
Terrorism,
U.N.
Treaty
Collection,
http://treaties.un.org/pages/
viewdetails.aspx?src=treaty&mtdsg.no=XVIlI-1 I&chapter= 18&lang=en.
76. Id. (signing on October 15, 2001, and ratifying on September 26, 2002).
77. Id. (signing on February 10, 2000, and ratifying on February 19, 2002).
78. Id. (signing on January 10, 2000, and ratifying on March 7, 2001).
79. Id. (signing on January 10, 2000, and ratifying on June 26, 2002).
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incorporates the definition. 80 The emerging consensus thus limits
the definition of terrorism to at least two fundamental notionsviolence
against civilians and political or ideological
motivations. 81 This emerging consensus still comes with a little bit
of a caveat. For example, all of the jurisdictions, save for
Australia, have recorded an objection to Jordan's understandings
of and explanations to the definition contained under article
2(1) (b).82 Jordan's reservation reads: "The Government of the
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan does not consider acts of national
armed struggle and fighting foreign occupation in the exercise of
people's right to self-determination as terrorist acts within the
context of paragraph 1 (b) of article 2 of the Convention." 83 The
United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada objected to this
in almost identical language. 84 For example, the U.S. objection
reads:
The Government of the United States of America, after
careful review, considers the statement made by Jordan
relating to paragraph 1(b) of Article 2 of the Convention
(the Declaration) to be a reservation that seeks to limit the
scope of the offense set forth in the Convention on a
unilateral basis. The Declaration is contrary to the object and
purpose of the Convention, namely, the suppression of the
financing of terrorist acts, irrespective of where they take
place or who carries them out. The Government of the
United States also considers the Declaration to be contrary to
the terms of Article 6 of the Convention, which provides:
"Each state party shall adopt such measures as may be
necessary,
including, where
appropriate,
domestic
legislation, to ensure that criminal acts within the scope of
this convention are under no circumstances justifiable by
considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological,
85
racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature."

80. See infra Part II.
81. This emerging consensus, particularly the political motivation aspect of it is
very intriguing. For a similar suggestion, see MCCORMACK, supra note 66, at 21.
82. See Status of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing
of Terrorism, supra note 75.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. The United States submitted its objections on October 6, 2004, and the
United Kingdom and Canada did the same on November 22, 2002, and August 22, 2004,
respectively. Id.
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It can be safely concluded that, as far as the definition of
terrorism is concerned, this is essentially where international law
stands today. 86 The absence of a universally accepted and
comprehensive international definition made a multitude of
national definitions and processes inevitable. Against this
background, Parts II and III identify and critically analyze the
terrorism-related asylum exclusion provisions of the four
jurisdictions in light of the above discussed doctrinal dilemma
and the identified international standards.
II. DESCRIPTIONOF THE SOURCES AND CONTENTS
The common source of international legal obligation for the
protection of refugees is the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees ("Refugee Convention"). 87 The
convention defines the eligibility for refugee status 88 and also
86. It is important to note that the effort in the United Nations to adopt a
comprehensive international terrorism treaty may make some progress towards a
universally agreed upon definition of terrorism. For an update of the status of U.N.
efforts to define terrorism, see Ad Hoc Committee Established by Resolution 51/210Terrorism, http://www.un.org/law/terrorism/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2010).
87. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6223,
189 U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter Refugee Convention]. Adopted to address refugee
problems in Europe after World War II, its applicability was geographically limited to
Europe and temporally limited to events before 1950. See id. art. 1(B)(1). These
limitations were lifted by the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31,
1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter Refugee Protocol]. Although the
protocol is an independent legal instrument, it incorporates the basic principles of the
convention by reference, id. art. 1 (1), but includes the definition of a refugee without
the temporal and geographic limitations. Id. arts. 1(2)-(3). All the four jurisdictions in
this study are state parties to either or both of these instruments. See Status of the
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, U.N. Treaty Collection,
http://treaties.un.org/pages/
viewdetails.aspx?src=treaty&mtdsg.no=V-2&chapter=5&lang=en; Status of the Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees, U.N. Treaty Database, http://treaties.un.org/pages/
viewdetails.aspx?src=treaty&mtdsg-no=V-5&chapter=5&lang=en.
The convention is a
standard-setting human rights instrument of profound importance. In the course of the
last half century, extensive scholarly literature expounded almost every aspect of the
convention. For some of the most notable works include GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL, THE
REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1996); ATLE GRAHL-MADSEN, 1-2 THE STATUS
OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (vol. 1, 1966, vol. II, 1972); JAMES C. HATHAWAY,
THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAw (2005).
88. See Refugee Convention, supra note 87, art. 1 (A) (2) (defining "refugee" as a
person who, "owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is
outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to
avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and
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provides several grounds for exclusion. 9 For purposes of this
Article, the most relevant exclusion ground is contained in article
33(1) of the convention, which is considered to be the jus cogens
of international protection for refugees. 90 The article reads in
full:
1. No Contracting State shall expel or return
("refouler") a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the
frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would
be threatened on account of his race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion.
2. The benefit of the present provision may not,
however, be claimed by a refugee whom there are
reasonable grounds for regardingas a danger to the security
of the country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by
a final judgment of a particularlyserious crime, constitutes a
danger to the community of that country.9 1
Although the convention does not use the word terrorism,
state parties often place terrorism under the rubric of the article
33(2) national security ground for exclusion. The parties to the
convention retain authority, however, to define what constitutes a
danger to their respective jurisdiction within their own domestic
laws. 92 All four jurisdictions in this study have rightfully done so.
Each jurisdiction, however, has defined what constitutes danger
to their security and justifies the exclusion of otherwise deserving
refugees with varying degrees of liberty. This Part surveys and
critically analyzes the domestic laws of the four jurisdictions
relating to the terrorism bar.

being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is
unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it").
Id. art. 1 (A) (2).
89. See id. art. 1 (F) (excluding from the convention "any person with respect to
whom there are serious reasons for considering that: (a) he has committed a crime
against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity, as defined in the international
instruments drawn up to make provision in respect of such crimes; (b) he has
committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge prior to his
admission to that country as a refugee; [or] (c) he has been guilty of acts contrary to the
purposes and principles of the United Nations").
90. See id. art. 33 (establishing the principle of nonrefoulement).
91. Id. (emphasis added).
92. See id. arts. 35-36; see also Refugee Protocol, supra note 87, arts. 2-3.
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UNITED STATES

The primary legislation incorporating the fundamental
principles of the Refugee Convention into U.S. domestic law is
the Refugee Act of 1980. 93 The Act adopts the grounds of
qualification and disqualification for refugee status under the
convention 94 and also streamlines adjudicative procedures.9 5 The
substantive laws and the procedures relating to the exclusion of
terrorists, as amended by a number of subsequent laws, 96 are
briefly described below.
1.

Substantive

The provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act
("INA") dealing with the terrorism exception are complex. This
section describes the substantive law and highlights the interplay
of these provisions.
While the INA adopts the core elements of a refugee as
defined by the Refugee Convention, 97 it broadens the grounds
for exclusion by including an unnecessarily complex definition of
terrorism. 98 Although the details are intricate, an examination of
the most relevant provisions is essential to understanding the
substantive scope of the exclusion. The INA provides that an
alien is not eligible for asylum if
the alien is described in subclause (I), (II), (III) (IV), or (VI)
of [8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)] or [§ 1227(a)(4)(B)]
(relating to terrorist activity), unless, in the case only of an
alien described in subclause (IV) of [§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)],
93. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980) (amending portions of the Immigration
and Nationality Act ("INA") of 1952 to revise the procedures for admission of refugees).

94. See id. § 201 (a) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (42) (2006)) (defining refugee).
95. See id. § 201(b) (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1157-59 (2006)) (establishing
procedures for overseas refugee program and asylum proceedings).
96. See, e.g., Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 110-161, div. J § 691(a),
121 Stat. 1844, 2364-65 (2007); REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 302
(2005); Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, §§ 403, 411-13,
417(d), 115 Stat. 272, 343-55 (2001); Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 354(a)(5), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-643
(1996); Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132, §§ 302, 40142 110 Stat. 1214, 1248-50, 1258-80 (1996).
97. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. §
1101 (a)(42) (2006 & Supp. 2008).
98. See8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A).
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the Attorney General determines, in the Attorney General's
discretion, that there are not reasonable grounds for
regarding the alien as a danger to the security of the United
States[.] 99
The cross-referenced subclauses of § 1182(a) (3)(B)(i) in
turn exclude two broad categories of persons based on either
conduct or affiliation: 00 those who have engaged, or are likely to
engage in "terrorist activity" and those who are affiliated with
"terrorist organizations" in different capacities.10 1
"Terrorist activity" is defined under the INA as
any activity which is unlawful under the laws of the place
where it is committed (or which, if it had been committed in
the United States, would be unlawful under the laws of the
United States or any State), and which involves any of the
following:
(V) The use of any(a) biological agent, chemical agent, or nuclear
weapons or device, or
(b) explosive, firearm, or other weapon or dangerous
device (other thanfor mere personalmonetary gain),
with intent to endanger, directly or indirectly, the safety of one
or more individuals or to cause substantial damage to
10 2
property.
The INA provides a tripartite breakdown of "terrorist
organizations," which are commonly referred to as tier I, tier II,
and tier III terrorist organizations based on the corresponding
provision of the INA. Tier I terrorist organizations are foreign
terrorist organizations designated by the Secretary of State under
§ 1189.103 An important step in the designation process is the
determination that the foreign terrorist organization threatens
99. Id. § 1158(b) (2) (A) (v).
100. Other categories that may not nicely fit under either conduct or affiliation
include endorsing or espousing terrorist activity, those who have received military
training on behalf of a terrorist organization, and those who are the spouse or child of
one who engages in terrorist activity. See id. § 1182(b) (3) (B) (i) (VII)-(IX).
101. See id. § 1182(b) (3) (B) (i) (I)-(VI).
102. Id. § 1182(b) (3) (B) (iii) (emphasis added).
103. See id. § 1182(b)(3)(B)(vi)(I); see also id. § 1189 (establishing an elaborate
procedure under which the Secretary of State can formally designate groups as terrorist
organizations).
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the interest and security of the United States and that it has the
capability to do So.104 Tier II terrorist organizations are similarly
designated by the Secretary of State in consultation with the
05
Attorney General and Department of Homeland Security.
Although this designation process does not follow the procedures
that apply for tier I organizations, the tier II designation also
takes the activities of the organization in to account. The
designation is also subject to public scrutiny through publication
in the Federal Register. 10 6 More interesting is the definition of a
tier III terrorist organization. That subdivision captures within
the definition of terrorist organization any entity "that is a group
of two or more individuals, whether organized or not, which
engages in, or a has subgroup which engages in, the activities
described in subsections (I) through (VI) of clause (iv)."107 The
cross-referenced
activities include preparing, advocating,
inciting, or soliciting funds for the commission of terrorist
activity,10 8 which in turn is defined in the manner described
above.10 9 This definition of terrorist activities includes not only
endorsing or espousing terrorist activity but also being a spouse
1
or child of one who does. 0
The scope of "engaging" in terrorism includes preparation,
incitement, and solicitation (of membership and funds), and also
providing material support."' Affiliation with a terrorist
organization in any capacity, including as a representative or
2
even as a mere member, is also grounds for exclusion."
The proper application of these provisions leads to the
following absurd, but real, results. At some time in 2006, Saman
Kareem Ahmed arrived in the United States on a special visa
104. See 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1)(B)-(C). For the U.S. State Department's list of
designated

terrorist

organizations, see

U.S.

Dep't of State,

Foreign

Terrorist

Organizations, http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm.
105. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (3) (B) (vi) (II); see also, e.g.,
Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66
Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 23, 2001) (authorizing the Secretary of State and the Secretary
of Treasury to freeze the assets of certain groups or individuals that they designate as
terrorist entities in consultation with other leaders in cabinet-level positions).
106. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (3) (B) (vi) (II).
107. Id. § 1182(a) (3) (B) (vi) (III).
108. See id.§ 1182(a) (3) (B) (iv).
109. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
110. See supra note 100. The child or spouse bar to admissibility has an exception
for those who did not know or should not have known. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (3)(B)(ii).
111. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(b) (3)(B)(iv).
112. See id.§§ 1182(b)(3)(B)(i)(IV)-(VI).
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available for those who assist U.S. forces in Iraq. l l3 His visa was
obtained at the recommendation of many U.S. officials,
including the top U.S. commander in Iraq, General David H.
Petraeus." 4 Once he arrived in the United States, he was granted
asylum because his life was threatened in Iraq as a result of his
support for U.S. forces. 1 5 He applied for adjustment of status to
lawful permanent resident after a year of asylum that was granted
to him lapsed.11 6 His adjustment was denied on terrorism
grounds," 7 which would also mean that his asylum would be
revoked."l 8 According to the media, "his application for
permanent residence was denied last month on grounds he had
once served Kurdish military forces that fought against
Hussein."" 9 The letter from Citizenship and Immigrations
Services denying Ahmed's petition said that the Kurdish
Democratic Party ("KDP") forces fit the terrorist definition,
based on information it had gleaned from public websites,
because KDP forces "conducted full-scale armed attacks and
helped incite rebellion against Hussein's regime, most notably
the Iran-Iraq war, Operation Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi
Freedom." 2 0 This draconian form of immigration control was
not unknown to immigration authorities. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement ("ICE") had taken the exact same
position two years earlier in In re Ma San Kywe.121 In this case,
counsel posed the hypothetical question during oral argument
before a local immigration court about whether Mohammed
Odeh Al Refaiel, an Iraqi lawyer who helped U.S. forces rescue a
U.S. marine private from a hospital in Nassiriyah, would be

113. Karen DeYoung, Stalwart Service for U.S. in Iraq Is Not Enough to Gain Green
Card,WASH. POST, Mar. 23, 2008, at Al.
114. See id.
115. See id,
116. See id.
117. See id.
118. See8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2), (c) (2).
119. Karen DeYoung, U.S. to Stop Green Card Denialsfor Dissidents,WASH. POST, Mar.
27, 2008, at Al.
120. Id.
121. See Won Kidane, The Terrorism Exception to Asylum: Managing the Uncertainty in
Status Determination,41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 669, 690-91 (2008) (citing GEORGETOWN
LAW CTR. HUMAN RIGHTS INST., UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES: REFUGEE VICTIMS OF THE

WAR ON TERROR 12 n.84 (2006)).
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excluded on terrorism grounds. 122 ICE unequivocally maintained
that Al Refaiel would be excluded on terrorism grounds because
he provided materials support to a terrorist organization. 123 The
terrorist organization in this example was U.S. forces because
they used weapons or dangerous devices, operated against the
laws of Saddam Hussein, and caused injury to persons and
damage to property, meeting all of the required elements of the
124
definition under the INA.
2.

Procedural

Under the INA, refugee status is determined in one of two
alternative procedures dependent on the location of the
applicant. If the applicant is located outside of the United States,
the application is processed under section 207 of the INA and
corresponding regulations. 125 If the applicant is located within
the United States, the application is processed under section 208
126
of the INA and corresponding regulations.
As indicated above, the substantive criteria for refugee status
and asylum status-including the exclusionary grounds-are
identical. The procedures for the adjudication of the claims are,
however, quite distinct. While refugee applications are processed
in one of the overseas processing locations, 127 asylum applications
are adjudicated in one of the asylum offices within the United
States. 128 Perhaps the most notable distinction is the availability of
appeals for those seeking asylum in the United States. Under the

122. See id. The rescue operation was a subject of wide media coverage. E.g.,
Dahleen Glanton & Douglas Holt, Commandos Storm Iraqi Hospital to Rescue POW, CHI.
TRIB., Apr. 2, 2003, at Al; Donna Leinwand et al., POW Rescue Sets Off Celebration, USA
TODAY, Apr. 3, 2003, at A5. The Iraqi, Mohamed Odeh Al Refaiel, who helped the U.S.
forces rescue one of their own was granted a special visa and resettled in the United
States. Although his situation was raised in this case, he was not a party to the litigation.
See Kidane, supra note 121, at 690.
123. Kidane, supra note 121, at 690.
124. Id.; see also supra notes 99-112.
125. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 207, 8 U.S.C. § 1157 (2006)
(providing an overseas refugee process); 8 C.F.R. §§ 207.1-.9 (2010).
126. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2006)
(providing a process for asylum applications); 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.1-.30 (2010).
127. See 8 C.F.R. § 207.1(a) (setting forth the application process including the
filing locations and process for aliens seeking refugee status).
128. See id. § 208.4(b) (setting forth the application process, including the filing
locations and process for various categories of asylum seekers).
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principle of consular nonreviewability, 29 decisions of an
immigration officer in overseas refugee status adjudication are
not subject to administrative or judicial review. 130 For an overseas
refugee, the immigration officer's determination is final. By
contrast, applicants in an asylum case may appeal the denial by
an asylum officer to an Article III court131 with an interesting
13 2
exception relevant to the terrorism ground of inadmissibility.
For asylum adjudication within the United States, there are
at least four alternative procedures depending on the
circumstances of each case. In a typical affirmative asylum
request by a person that is not currently detained and who had
already been admitted under some nonimmigrant category, an
asylum officer ordinarily refers cases involving the terrorism bar
to an immigration judge. 13 3 The immigration judge then
adjudicates whether the claimant falls under the terrorism
exception under the substantive criteria described above. 134 The
decision of the immigration judge may be appealed to the Board
of Immigration Appeals ("BIA"). 135 Although in ordinary cases,
the determination of the BIA is subject to judicial review, the INA
expressly precludes judicial review of denials of asylum on
36
grounds of terrorism.
The second possible adjudicative procedure involves the
certification power of the Attorney General. Under the INA, "the
Attorney General may certify an alien under this paragraph if the
Attorney General has reasonable grounds to believe" that the
129. See, e.g., Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766 (1972); Saavedra Bruno v.
Albright, 197 F.3d 1153, 1157-58 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Ulrich v. Kellogg, 30 F.2d 984, 986
(D.C. Cir. 1929).
130. See8 C.F.R. § 207.4.
131. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (2) (B) (2006) (providing that the discretionary relief is
not subject to judicial review but excepting asylum). Asylum under 8 U.S.C. 1158 is a
discretionary form of relief as opposed to withholding of removal under the INA, which
is nondiscretionary. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(v) (discussing the discretionary
terrorism exception to asylum), with 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (b) (3) (A) (discussing refugee status
adjudication).
132. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b) (2) (D) (prohibiting judicial review of determinations
made by the discretionary denial of asylum under section 1158(b) (2) (A) (v) of title 8).

133. See8 C.F.R. § 208.14(c) (1).
134. Id. §§ 208.9-.19 (outlining procedure for reviewing asylum applications).
135. See8 U.S.C. § 1158(d) (5); see also 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.9-.19, 1003.3(a).
136. See supra notes 131-32.Judicial review under the INA is a subject of continued
controversy and litigation. The basic thrust of 8 U.S.C.1252 is that it limits judicial review
to final deportation order by courts of appeals and, even then, the review is limited to
errors of law and constitutional issues. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (2) (D), (a) (5).
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alien meets the definition of terrorism discussed above or is
engaged in any other activity that jeopardizes the national
security of the United States. 137 This certification authority
cannot be delegated to anyone except the Deputy Attorney
General. 3 8 While a certified terrorist is detained, the Attorney
General is required to either charge him with criminal offense or
initiate a removal hearing. 39 A certification by the Attorney
General almost always bars the respondent from asylum. 14° The
INA requires a periodic review of those who remain in detention
because the government was unable to remove them to another
country. 141 Certified persons may also seek judicial review of their
detention by on collateral review by habeas corpus under limited
circumstances. 142
143
The third possible procedure applies to "arriving aliens."'
Aliens seeking admission at any port of entry are subject to a very
swift and crude procedure. An immigration officer may order an
arriving alien removed immediately upon arrival if the inspecting
officer "suspects that an arriving alien may be inadmissible" on
terrorism grounds described above. 144 The Attorney General is,
however, provided with authority to review these orders. 145 If the
Attorney General agrees with the determination of the
immigration officer, the alien must be deported forthwith
without any further hearing or review. 146 Finally, the Attorney
General is permitted to use confidential evidence, which may not
147
be shared with anyone, to reach his or her determination.
Separate from these three avenues, there is a fourth set of
procedures known as "Alien Terrorist Removal Procedures" that
137. See8 U.S.C. § 1226a(a) (3).
138. See id. § 1226a(a) (4).
139. See id. § 1226a(a) (5).
140. See id. § 1158(b) (2) (A) (v).
141. See id. § 1226a(a) (6).
142. See id. § 1226a(b).
143. 8 C.F.R. § 1.1 (q) (2010) (defining the the term "arriving alien" as a person
who is seeking admission at a port of entry). Seeking "admission" is another term of art
including not only those who have never been to the United States and just arrived, but
also those who have had permanent residence but stayed outside of the United States for
more than 180 days, and others who are considered to be seeking admission for
commission of certain types of crimes. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(13).
144. See8 U.S.C. § 1225(c)(1) (emphasis added).
145. See id. § 1225(c) (2) (A).
146. See id. § 1225(c) (2) (B).
147. See id. § 1225(c) (2) (B).
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involve the Alien Terrorist Removal Court ("ATRC").1 48
Although the ATRC has not been established yet, as will be
elaborated in the last part of this Article, 149 it is perhaps the best
system to deal with terrorism-related removal cases. Structurally,
it designed to be an Article III court under the Supreme Court
with five judges selected by the Chief Justice of the United States
from among judges of the federal district courts. 150 The primary
reason for the establishment of this court is to provide for a
special forum for the adjudication of terrorism-related cases,
especially when confidential evidence is likely to be used, and the
traditional removal proceeding would not be appropriate for
national security reasons. 151 The ATRC is also built with
constitutionally sound due process guarantees. 152 More important
among these guarantees is the right to a government-appointed
counsel. 153 The INA does not provide this right in regular
155
removal procedures. 154 Other rights include: adequate notice;
an expeditious and public hearing; 156 and a reasonable
opportunity to introduce evidence,'157 including the use of
subpoenas for the appearance of witnesses and records included
at government expense. 158 The decision of the ATRC may be
appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
148. The ATRC was a result of the 1996 expansion of terrorism grounds of
exclusion under the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Pub.
L. No. 104-208, § 354(a) (5), 110 Stat. 3009 (1996), and the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
149. See discussion infra Part III.C.
150. See id. § 1532. The Chief Justice may appoint one or more of the judges
currently serving on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, see id., established in
1978 pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a).
151. See id. § 1533(a) (1) (providing the requirements for the Attorney General to
seek removal of an alien).
152. Interestingly, suspected terrorists subjected to this process seem to have more
fights and due process guarantees than suspected terrorists subject to the regular
removal proceedings. See 8 U.S.C. § 1533.
153. See See 8 U.S.C. § 1532(e) (establishing a panel of special attorneys to review
classified evidence filed against the alien); 8 U.S.C. § 1534(c) (1) (providing the right to
be present and the right to counsel).
154. See id § 1229(b) (4).
155. See id. § 1534(b).
156. See id. § 1534(a) (1) (2). Although the hearing is public, confidential evidence
is examined in camera. See id. § 1534(d) (5), (e)(3)(A). Although the alien is denied
direct access to classified information, a specially appointed attorney can review the
evidence and the alien is entitled to a summary of the evidence. See id. § 1534(e) (3) (F).
157. See id. § 1534(c) (2).
158. See id. § 1534(d)(1)-(2).
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Columbia Circuit. 159 Unlike in regular removal proceedings, a
petition for review automatically stays removal. 60 Where a
summary of confidential evidence is denied to an alien lawfully
admitted for permanent residence, appellate review is automatic
unless the alien waives it.161 Finally, the alien may also petition
the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. 162 For several reasons,
including the obstacle that this elaborate due process might
create in removing anyone suspected of terrorism, as of yet, this
court only exists on the books. This Article argues that installing
this court with some structural modifications might be the best
solution to the problem of excluding genuine refugees on
terrorism grounds. This argument is further developed in Part
III.C.2 below.
B.

United Kingdom

The United Kingdom ratified the Refugee Protocol, which
incorporates the Refugee Convention, in 1968163 and enacted a
comprehensive Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act in 1993,
giving effect to the basic principles of the protocol. 164 The United
Kingdom's national immigration legislation has undergone
significant revisions since its enactment in 1993.165 Although
166
antiterrorism laws in the United Kingdom have a long history,
the antiterrorism provisions of most current importance to
immigration regulation include the Terrorism Act of 2000,167 the
Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act of 2001,16 the
Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act of 2002,169 the

159. See§ 1535(c) (1).
160. See id.
161. See id. § 1535(c) (2).
162. See id. § 1535(d).
163. See Status of the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, supranote 87.
164. Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act, 1993, c. 23.
165. See, e.g., Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act, 2006, c. 13; Asylum and
Immigration Act, 2004, c. 19; Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act, 2002, c. 41;

Immigration and Asylum Act, 1999, c. 33.
166. See generally LAURA K. DONAHUE, COUNTER-TERRORIST LAW AND EMERGENCY
POWERS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 1922-2000 (2001) (providing a thorough account of

the United Kingdom's relatively older anti-terrorism laws including emergency powers
in the context of the conflict in Northern Ireland).
167. Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11.
168. Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, c. 24.
169. Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act, 2002, c. 41.
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Prevention of Terrorism Act of 2005,170 the Immigration, Asylum
and Nationality Act of 2006,171 and the Terrorism Act of 2006.172
Together these laws provide for the United Kingdom's
substantive and procedural framework for the determination of
asylum status including the terrorism exclusionary grounds.
1.

Substantive

The Terrorism Act of 2000 employs several provisions in an
attempt to define "terrorism. ' 173 A close reading of these
provisions suggests that there are generally three levels of
involvement that could lead to the finding of terrorism:
commission, association, and support. A person who uses or
threatens to use force to influence government 174 or to
intimidate the public or a section of the public 75 for the purpose
of advancing a political, religious, or ideological cause and it
results in serious violence to persons or serious damage to
property, 176 endangers a person's life, or creates a risk to health
commits terrorism. 177 As far as terrorism by association is
concerned, any membership or professed membership to a
proscribed organization results in the finding of terrorism,
provided that the association occurred at a time when the
organization was proscribed. 7 8 The Secretary of State is provided
authority to add groups to the list of proscribed organizations,
attached as schedule two to the Act,179 if he or she "believes that
it is concerned in terrorism."' 80 The phrase "concerned in
terrorism" is interpreted to include preparation, encouragement,
170. Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2005, c. 2.
171. Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act, 2006, c. 13.
172. Terrorism Act, 2006, c. 11.
173. See Terrorism Act, 2000, c.ll, §§ 1-13.
174. This language encompasses any government in the world. See id. § 1(4) (d).
175. This language encompasses the public of any country in the world. See id. §
1(4) (c).
176. This language encompasses persons or property situated anywhere in the
world. See id. § 1 (4) (b).
177. See id. § 1 (1)-(2).
178. See id. § 11(1)-(2).
179. See id. sched. 2.
180. See id. § 3(4). Elaborate provisions govern the conditions of challenging
proscription in court. See id. §§ 4-9. For the United Kingdom's list of designated
terrorist
organizations,
see
Home
Office,
Proscribed
Terrorist
Groups,
http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/legislation/current-legislation/terrorism-act-2000/
proscribed-groups.html (last visitedJan. 24, 2010).
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participation, or commission of acts of terrorism, which are
described above.18 1 Finally, support includes any kind of aid or
assistance including, but not limited to, inviting support,
arranging and managing meetings, encouraging support, fundraising, and receiving money when there is reason to suspect is
182
will be used for terrorism.
The breadth of the definition contained in the 2000
Terrorism Act being evident,18 3 it bears note that subsequent
U.K. enactments broadened it even further. The most notable
expansion of the definition is contained in the Terrorism Act of
2006.184 Although the basic substance of the definition remains
the same, elaborate provisions were added in the areas of
preparation, encouragement, incitement, receiving terrorist
181. See id. §§ 3(5)(a)-(d).
182. See id. §§ 11-15. Section 13 is notable for its peculiarity and freedom of speech
concerns. Id. § 13 ("A person in a public place commits an offence [of terrorism] if he
(a) wears an item of clothing, or (b) wears, carries or displays an article, in such a way or
in such circumstances as to arouse reasonable suspicion that he is a member or
supporter of a proscribed organization.").
183. Since its enactment, the Terrorism Act of 2000 has been a subject of serious
criticism. Commentators have called it the harshest terrorism law in force and have
noted its effective impact on those seeking asylum. See, e.g., The Terrorism Act-Embracing
Tyranny, CAMPAIGN AGAINST RACISM & FAScIsM (Campaign Against Racism & Fascism,
London), June-July 2001, available at http://www.irr.org.uk/carf/feat51.html. The crux
of the criticism is contained in this passage:
The impact that the Act, and the proscription of several mainstream liberation
organisations, will have on the right to asylum, will be vast. If it is a criminal
offence to belong, or to profess support for, the PKK or the LTT'E or the
Mujahideen, what can an asylum-seeker say, who fears persecution at home for
his or her support for one of these organisations? Support for the liberation
struggle is the foundation for most asylum claims by Tamils, Turkish Kurds,
Kashmiris and others. Someone who supports the Kurdish liberation
movement will almost invariably support the PKK-and if he doesn't, he'll
certainly be suspected of it. Assertion of an asylum claim could thus lead to
criminal charges. The Home Office has, according to immigration lawyers,
told its civil servants who present immigration and asylum appeals to notify it
of anyone who claims on appeal to be a member or supporter of any of the
listed organisations. It is likely that the information will be passed on to police.
It's a case of "damned if you do; damned if you don't"-an asylum-seeker who
claims support or membership of a listed group risks arrest, and one who
disavows support for the group will have the claim rejected on the ground that
he or she is not persecuted at home. Many people, faced with this dilemma,
are likely not to claim asylum at all, although they deserve to be granted
refugee status.
Id.
184. See Terrorism Act, 2006, c. 11, §§ 13, 21-27, 29-30, 34, 37 (amending the
Terrorism Act, 2000).
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training, and the like. 185 A notable substantive revision of the
definition is the addition of "an international governmental
organization" to the list of entities whose decisions the use or
threat of force must be designed to influence.1 8 6 The most
significant addition to the bar to asylum comes from section 54 of
the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act of 2006, which
states:
(1) In the construction and application of Article 1 (F) (c) of
the Refugee Convention the reference to acts contrary to the
purposes and principles of the United Nations shall be taken
as including, in particular(a)

acts

of committing,

preparing

or instigating

terrorism (whether or not the acts amount to an actual
or inchoate offence), and
(b) acts of encouraging or inducing others to commit,
prepare or instigate terrorism (whether or not the acts
amount to an actual or inchoate offence) 187
The addition of this provision doubles the avenue of
exclusion which was originally limited to finding a link between
the terrorist act and the threat to national security. 8 8 In other
185. See id. § 1.
186. See id. § 34.
187. See Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act, 2006, c. 13, § 54.
188. The precise nature of this link is not clear under U.K- law. For example, in
Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Rehman, [2001] UKHL 47, [2003] 1 A.C. 153
(appeal taken from Eng.), the Secretary ordered Rehman, a Pakistani national,
deported on national security grounds. Id. at [1]. He appealed to the Special
Immigration Appeals Commission. IM The Commission reversed the Secretary's decision
for lack of evidence showing the impact of the alleged activities on United Kingdom
national security. See id. at [2]. The Secretary appealed to the Court of Appeal. Id, at [6].
The Court of Appeal reversed. Id. Rehman then appealed to the House of Lords. Id. at
[13]. In affirming the decision of the Court of Appeal, Lord Slynn observed importantly:
I accept that there must be a real possibility of an adverse affect on the United
Kingdom for what is done by the individual under inquiry but I do not accept
that it has to be direct or immediate. Whether there is such a real possibility is
a matter which has to be weighed up by the Secretary of State and balanced
against the possible injustice to that individual if a deportation order is made.
Id. at [16]. Lord Slynn went on to say:
In conclusion even though the Commission has powers of review both of fact
and of the exercise of the discretion, the Commission must give due weight to
the assessment and conclusions of the Secretary of State in the light at any
particular time of his responsibilities, or of Government policy and the means
at his disposal of being informed of and understanding the problems involved.
He is undoubtedly in the best position tojudge what national security requires
even if his decision is open to review. The assessment of what is needed in the
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words, whosoever is considered a terrorist pursuant to the above
described definition may be denied asylum under the
independent ground of article 1(F) (c) of the Refugee
Convention even if there are some conceivable ways that he may
not be considered a threat to national security. 89 A comparative
analysis of this definition and the other three jurisdictions is
provided in Part III below. 190
2.

Procedural

The United Kingdom took a procedurally significant step
when it enacted the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act of
2006. This Act allows the Secretary of State for the Home
Department to certify asylum-seekers as terrorists and exclude
them on grounds of national security even if they meet all the
asylum requirements. 191 The Act mandates the administrative
tribunals that adjudicate asylum, particularly the Asylum and
Immigration Tribunal, to consider the certification before they
adjudicate the asylum claim, and to summarily dismiss the case if
they agree with the Secretary's disposition. 192 If the Secretary of
State "acting in person"' 93 certifies the asylum applicant on
national security grounds, an appeal "may not be brought or
continued" in the regular administrative system. 194 Instead, cases

light of changing circumstances is primarily for him. On an appeal the Court
of Appeal and your Lordships' House no doubt will give due weight to the
conclusions of the Commission, constituted as it is of distinguished and
experienced members, and knowing as it did, and as usually the court will not
know, of the contents of the "closed" evidence and hearing. If any of the
reasoning of the Commission shows errors in its approach to the principles to
be followed, then the courts can intervene. In the present case I consider that
the Court of Appeal was right in its decision on both of the points which arose
and in its decision to remit the matters to the Commission for redetermination
in accordance with the principles which the Court of Appeal and now your
Lordships have laid down. I would accordingly dismiss the appeal.
Id. at [26].
189. These circumstances are obviously narrow in view of the Rehman case cited
and discussed supra note 188. See Kate O'Hanlon, Law Report: Threat to National Security
Did Not Have to be Targeted at United Kingdom, INDEPENDENT (London), Oct. 17, 2001, at
6; The TerrorismAct-Embracing Tyranny, supra note 183.
190. See infra Part III.A.
191. See Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act, 2006, c. 13, § 55(1).
192. See id. § 55(3)-(4).
193. See Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act, 2002, c. 41, § 97(4).
194. See id. § 97(1)-(3).
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rejected on national security grounds may be appealed to the
Special Immigration Appeals Commission ("SIAC").195
As the name indicates, the SIAC is a specialized "superior
court of record" created by the Special Immigration Appeals
Commission Act 1997.196 It hears appeals in cases where the
Home Secretary exercises statutory powers to exclude or deport a
noncitizen from the United Kingdom on national security
grounds. 197 Although the SIAC is referred to as a "court of
record," it appears to be a specialized quasi-judicial, quasiadministrative body. As currently constituted by the Lord
Chancellor pursuant to his statutory authority, 198 the commission
has a panel of three members: one who has held high judicial
office, one with experience serving on the Asylum and
Immigration Tribunal, and one with experience in national
security matters. 99 The Commission has elaborate rules of
procedure.2 00 The evidentiary records of the published cases
appear to be thorough, and the decisions seem to be well
reasoned.2 0 ' The individual appealing to the SIAC is even entitled
to appointed counsel. 20 2 Finally, an appellate court with
appropriate jurisdiction can review questions of law material to
the decision of the SIAC. 203 However, the SIAC Act authorizes the
195. See Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act, 1997, c. 68, § 2(1) (g).
196. See id. § 1(1); see also Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC)About Us, http://siac.tribunals.gov.uk/aboutus.htm (last visitedJan. 24, 2010).
197. See § 2(1); see also Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC)-About
Us, supra note 196.
198. See Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act sched. 1, § 2(1) (specifying
that the commission "shall consist of such number of members appointed by the Lord
Chancellor as he may determine").
199. See Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC)-About Us, supra note
196.
200. See Special Immigration Appeals Commission (Procedure) Rules, 2003, S.I.
2003/1034.
201. See, e.g., DD v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2007] UKSIAC 42/2005
(granting appeal of a Libyan asylum-seeker, who was excluded on terrorism grounds,
because the commission suspected that, although the Libyan government offered
diplomatic assurances against torture, the assurances were not likely to be honored),
affid, A.S. (Lybia) v. Sec'y of Sate for the Home Dep't, [2008] EWCA (Civ) 289, [2008]
H.R.L.R. 28; G v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2007] UKSIAC 2/2005 (dismissing
an appeal of an Algerian asylum-seeker on terrorism grounds after a thorough consider
of the evidence).
202. See Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act § 6(1)-(3). But see id. § 6(4)
("A person appointed under subsection (1) above shall not be responsible to the person
whose interest he is appointed to represent.").
203. See id. § 7.
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Lord Chancellor to make rules "enabling proceedings before the
Commission to take place without the appellant [or his attorney]
being given full particulars of the reasons for the decision which
is the subject of the appeal." 2 4 The appellant may receive a
summary of the evidence heard ex parte.2 0 5 These confidential
20 6
proceedings are obviously a source of severe criticism.
C. Canada
The latest and most important Canadian immigration law is
the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act of 2001
("IRPA"). 207 The Act incorporates the basic provisions of the
Refugee Convention, most particularly the inclusion and
exclusion clauses. 208 This section briefly highlights the substantive
provisions and procedures relating to the terrorism bar to
asylum.
As a preliminary matter, Canada accords refugee protection
to those who apply before or after entering the country. 20 9
Although the obligations of the Refugee Convention do not
extend to the overseas refugee program, the substantive criteria
for the determination of refugee status are identical. 210 As the
focus of this Article is on the claims adjudicated within each
jurisdiction, the peculiarities of the overseas program are not
discussed here.
1. Substantive
The IRPA's relatively concise security-related grounds of
inadmissibility are contained in section 34. It provides:
(1) A permanent resident or a foreign national
inadmissible on security grounds for

is

204. See id. § 5(3)(a).
205. See id. § 5(3) (d).
206. See, e.g., Deportation Policy Questioned by Court, AMNESTY INT'L, Apr. 9 2008,
http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/news/
uk-deportation-policy-questioned-court-20080409.
207. See Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, 2001 S.C., ch. 27.
208. See id. § 96 (reproducing the definition of "refugee" found in the Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees' ("Refugee Convention")); see also id. § 98
(incorporating the exclusion provisions of the Refugee Convention).
209. See id. § 99(1).
210. See id. § 99(2).
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(a) engaging in an act of espionage or an act of
subversion against a democratic government, institution
or process as they are understood in Canada;
(b) engaging in or instigating the subversion by force of
any government;
(c) engaging in terrorism;
(d) being a danger to the security of Canada;
(e) engaging in acts of violence that would or might
endanger the lives or safety of persons in Canada; or
(f) being a member of an organization that there are
reasonable grounds to believe engages, has engaged or
will engage in acts referred to in paragraph (a), (b) or
(c).211

The exception to this general rule renders the preceding text
inapplicable against anyone who "satisfies the Minister that their
presence in Canada would not be detrimental to the national
212
interest."
Interestingly the IRPA does not directly define the terms
"terrorism" or "danger to the security of Canada." Canada's
definition of terrorism is contained in the Anti-terrorism Act of
2001

("ATA").

213

The ATA incorporates

the definition

of

terrorism from all of the terrorism-related conventions to which
Canada is a party, including the International Convention for the
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. 2 4 The familiar
concepts of engaging in terrorism, terrorist activity, and terrorist
organizations are also employed to define the proscribed
conducts and omissions. 215 Section 83.01 (1) (b) defines "terrorist
activity" as:
(b) an act or omission, in or outside Canada,
(i) that is committed
(A) in whole or in part for a political, religious or
ideological purpose, objective or cause, and

211. See id. § 34(1).
212. See id. § 34(2).
213. See Anti-terrorism Act, 2001 S.C., ch. 41 (Can.).
214. See id. § 83.01 (1) (a). For the incorporation of the definition of terrorism
found in the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of
Terrorism, see id. § 83.01 (1)(a)(x).
215. See id. §§ 83.01-.05.
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(B) in whole or in part with the intention of
intimidating the public, or a segment of the
public, with regard to its security, including its
economic security, or compelling a person, a
government or a domestic or an international
organization to do or to refrain from doing any
act, whether the public or the person, government
or organization is inside or outside Canada, and
(ii) that intentionally
(A) causes death or serious bodily harm to a
person by the use of violence,
(B) endangers a person's life,
(C) causes a serious risk to the health or safety of
the public or any segment of the public,
(D) causes substantial property damage, whether
to public or private property, if causing such
damage is likely to result in the conduct or harm
referred to in any of clauses (A) to (C), or
(E) causes serious interference with or serious
disruption of an essential service, facility or system,
whether public or private, other than as a result of
advocacy, protest, dissent or stoppage of work that
is not intended to result in the conduct or harm
referred to in any of clauses (A) to (C),
and includes a conspiracy, attempt or threat to commit
any such act or omission, or being an accessory after the
fact or counselling in relation to any such act or
omission, but, for greater certainty, does not include an act
or omission that is committed during an armed conflict and
that, at the time and in the place of its commission, is in
accordance with customary internationallaw or conventional
international law applicable to the conflict, or the activities
undertaken by military forces of a state in the exercise of their
official duties, to the extent that those activities are governed
216
by other rules of internationallaw.
"Terrorist group" means:
(a) an entity that has as one of its purposes or activities
facilitating or carrying out any terrorist activity, or
(b) a listed entity,
216. See id. § 83.01 (1)(b) (emphasis added).
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217
and includes an association of such entities.

The Canadian officials that certify noncitizens as a national
security threat apply this substantive definition of terrorism to
arrive at a certification conclusion. It bears note that this
definition of terrorism was recently upheld on constitutional
grounds. In Suresh v. Canada,218 the Canadian Supreme Court
held that despite the apparent vagueness of the definition
contained in various conventions, the term "terrorism" provides
a "sufficient basis for adjudication" of claims and as such is not
constitutionally void for vagueness. 219 Suresh is perhaps even
more important for its discussion on national security
determinations. Substantively, Suresh stands for the proposition
that a person will only be considered a danger to Canada if, in
addition to falling under the definition of terrorism,
he or she poses a serious threat to the security of Canada,
whether direct or indirect, and bearing in mind the fact that
the security of one country is often dependent on the
security of other nations. The threat must be "serious," in
the sense that it must be grounded on objectively reasonable
suspicion based on evidence and in the sense that the
threatened harm must be substantial rather than
220
negligible.

Procedurally, the Supreme Court articulated a Chevron-type
deferential standard for security threat determinations by
administrative authorities.2 2 1 In relation to this, the court said:
In reviewing ministerial decisions to deport under the Act,
courts must accord deference to those decisions. If the
Minister has considered the correct factors, the courts
217. Id For Canada's list of designated terrorist organizations, see Public Safety
Canada, Currently Listed Entities Jan. 13, 2010), http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/prg/
ns/le/cle-eng.aspx.
218. [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3, 2002 SCC 1.
219. Id. at [93].
220. Id. at [90].
221. Compare id at [29]-[34] ("We agree with Robertson J.A. that the reviewing
court should adopt a deferential approach to this question and should set aside the
Minister's discretionary decision if it is patently unreasonable in the sense that it was
made arbitrarily or in bad faith, it cannot be supported on the evidence, or the Minister
failed to consider the appropriate factors. The court should not reweigh the factors or
interfere merely because it would have come to a different conclusion."), with Chevron
v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (holding that the decisions of an
administrative agency entrusted with the task of administering a statute must be given
deference if the statute is ambiguous).
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should not reweigh them. Provided the ... decision is not

patently
unreasonable-unreasonable
on
its
face,
unsupported by the evidence, or vitiated by failure to
consider the proper factors or apply the appropriate
procedures-it should be upheld. At the same time, the
courts have an important role to play in ensuring that the
Minister has considered the relevant factors and complied
with the requirements of the Act and the Constitution. 222
Even though the Supreme Court announced this deferential
standard of review, it set aside the lower court's ruling affirming
the government's decision to deport a Sri Lankan refugee on the
3
basis of insufficient procedural due process. 22
2.

Procedural

Multiple departments and administrative agencies are
involved in the enforcement of Canada's immigration law. 224 The
principal Canadian authorities entrusted with the task of
administering the IRPA are the Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration ("Immigration Minister"), 225 and the Minster of

222. See Suresh, 2002 SCC at [41]. The Canadian Supreme Court relied on the
House of Lords' decision in Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Rehman. See
[2001] UKHL 47, [2003] 1 A.C. 153 (appeal taken from Eng.). In particular, the Court
quoted the following statement of Lord Hoffmann:
I wrote this speech some three months before the recent events in New York
and Washington. They are a reminder that in matters of national security, the
cost of failure can be high. This seems to me to underline the need for the judicial
arm of government to respect the decisions of ministers of the Crown on the question of
whether support for terrorist activities in a foreign country constitutes a threat to
national security. It is not only that the executive has access to special
information and expertise in these matters. It is also that such decisions, with
serious potential results for the community, require a legitimacy which can be
conferred only by entrusting them to persons responsible to the community
through the democratic process. If the people are to accept the consequences
of such decisions, they must be made by persons whom the people have
elected and whom they can remove.
Suresh, 2002 SCC at [33] (quoting Rehman, [2001] UKHL at [62] (Hoffman, L.J.)).
223. See Suresh, 2002 SCC at [130]. In particular the court held that the danger the
individual is supposed to pose to the safety of Canada must be weighed against the
danger the individual may face if deported to his country. Id. at [129]. In this case, it was
settled that the claimant would face torture in his home country of Sri Lanka because of
his support for the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealam (L'T"E). See id. at [7]-[12].
224. See generally Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, 2001 S.C., ch. 27, § 4
(Can.) (enumerating the various departments that administer the immigration law).
225. Seeid. § 4(1).
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Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness ("Public Safety
Minister") .226 The Public Safety Minister's power extends to:
(a) examinations at ports of entry;
(b) the enforcement of [the] Act, including arrest, detention
and removal;
(c) the establishment of policies respecting the enforcement
of this Act and inadmissibility on grounds of security,
organized criminality or violating human or international
rights; or
(d) determinations under any of subsections 34(2), 35(2)
and 37(2).227
The most relevant of the cross-referenced sections is section
34(2), which relates to security threat determination.2 2 8 That
provision gives the Public Safety Minister the power to waive the
security-related exception to admissibility if "the foreign national
... satisfies" the Minster that his or her "presence in Canada
would not be detrimental to the national interest. "229
The principal administrative agency that adjudicates
immigration cases is the Immigration and Refugee Board
("IRB").230 It is the largest Canadian independent administrative
tribunal.2 31 The IRB consists of the Refugee Protection Division,
the Refugee Appeal Division, the Immigration Division, and the
Immigration Appeals Division. 232 Evidently, refugee issues are
adjudicated by separate and specialized divisions of the IRB
233
under elaborate and separate sections of the IRPA.
A claim for refugee status must be made to an immigration
officer within the Canadian Ministry of Immigration and
235
Citizenship, 234 at any location including at the ports of entry.
The officer then prescreens the application to determine if there
226. See id. § 4(2).
227. See id.
228. See id. § 34(2).
229. See id.
230. See id. § 151.
231. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, About the Board (Apr. 16, 2009),
http://www.irb-cisr.gc.ca/eng/brdcom/abau/.
232. Immigration and Refugee Protection Act § 151.
233. See id. §§ 95-111.
234. See Citizenship and Immigration Canada, What We Do (July 30, 2009),
http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/department/what.asp.
235. See Immigration and Refugee Protection Act § 99(3).
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are any grounds of inadmissibility that would preclude
consideration of the refugee status application. 236 If there
appears to be a possibility that an alien is inadmissible on one of
these grounds, the case will be referred to the Refugee
Protection Board for an admissibility hearing. 237 The refugee
status consideration is then suspended until the results of the
admissibility hearing are known. 23 8 To this effect, the IRPA
provides that
(1) Proceedings of the Refugee Protection Division and of
the Refugee Appeal Division are suspended on notice by an
officer that
(a) the matter has been referred to the Immigration
Division to determine whether the claimant is
inadmissible on grounds of security, violating human or
international rights, serious criminality or organized
239
criminality.
This would mean that if security-related grounds of
inadmissibility are implicated, the refugee status determination
would have to wait until those inadmissibility grounds are
adjudicated separately through the admissibility hearings of the
Immigration Division under part 1 of the IRPA and not part 2,
which deals with refugee issues. After the admissibility hearing, if
the Immigration Division determines that the applicant for
refugee status is not inadmissible for security or other grounds,
then the adjudication of refugee status by the Refugee Protection
Division proceeds as usual, including judicial review where
applicable.2 40 If, however, the claimant is determined to be

236. See id. § 100(1) ("An officer shall, within three working days after receipt of a
claim referred to in subsection 99(3), determine whether the claim is eligible to be
referred to the Refugee Protection Division and, if it is eligible, shall refer the claim in
accordance with the rules of the Board.").
237. See id. § 100(2).
238. See id. § 100(2) (a).
239. Seeid. § 103(1)(a).
240. See id.§ 103(2). This could include appeal to the Refugee Appeal Division. See
id.§ 110. This could also include judicial review under sections 72 to 75. See id.§§ 72-75;
see also id.
§ 74(d) ("[A]n appeal to the Federal Court of Appeals may be made only if, in
rendering judgment, the judge certifies that a serious question of general importance is
involved and states the question."). However, leave for judicial review is rarely granted,
and even when it is granted, review results in reversal of the decisions of the
administrative agencies in less than one percent of the cases. See JASON KENNEY,
IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE BOARD OF CANADA, PERFORMANCE REPORT FOR THE PERIOD
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inadmissible for security reasons, then the initial refugee status
241
claim is terminated.
Where the security grounds of inadmissibility are invoked, a
separate security threat certification, detention, and removal
process is triggered. 242 Under section 77(1) of the Act, the Public
Safety Minister and the Immigration Minister are authorized to
jointly certify a noncitizen as a security threat, 243 and refer the
case to the Canadian Federal Court. When the certificate is
referred to the federal court, the Act provides that:
the Minister shall file with the Court the information and
other evidence on which the certificate is based, and a
summary of information and other evidence that enables the
person who is named in the certificate to be reasonably
informed of the case made by the Minister but does not
include anything that, in the Minister's opinion, would be
injurious to national security or endanger the safety of any
244
person if disclosed.
The court reviews the certificate and accompanying records for
reasonableness, and "shall quash the certificate" if it determines
that it is unreasonable.2 45 If not quashed, the security certificate is
considered to be "conclusive proof that the person named in it is
inadmissible and is a removal order that is in force without it
being necessary to hold or continue an examination or
admissibility hearing." 246 The federal court's reasonableness
determination may be appealed to the Federal Court of Appeals
only if the judge who made the determination "certifies that a
serious question of general importance is involved and states the
247
question."
If a person is certified as a security threat in this way and
ordered removed, two provisions of last resort come into play.
The first one is predicated on the nonrefoulement provision of

ENDING MARCH 31, 2008 at 4 (2008), available at http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/dpr-rmr/
2007-2008/inst/irb/irb-eng.pdf.
241. See Immigration and Refugee Protection Act § 104(1) (b), (2) (a).
242. See generally id. §§ 77-87 (providing for detailed rules of certification,
detention, release, and removal on security grounds).
243. See id. § 77(1).
244. See id. § 77(2).
245. See id. § 78.
246. See id. § 80.
247. See id. § 79.

340

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 33:300

the Refugee Convention.2 48 It provides that "a protected person
or a person who is recognized as a Convention refugee by
another country to which the person may be returned shall not
be removed from Canada to a country where they would be at
risk of persecution.
... 249 However, this bar to refoulement
does not benefit a person who is considered inadmissible for
security reasons if "in the opinion of the Minister, the person should
not be allowed to remain in Canada on the basis of the nature
and severity of the acts committed or danger to the security of
Canada." 250 This provision applies only to "protected persons"
defined to include those who had already been recognized as
convention refugees or those who benefit from removal stay
under a last resort procedure called "pre-removal Risk
Assessment." 251 The IRPA provides for a separate pre-removal risk
assessment procedure.2 52 A person named in a section 77(1)
certificate may apply to the Minister for a risk assessment before
removal. 2 3 The risk assessment takes into account the likelihood
and nature of the risk on the one hand and the nature and
severity of the danger the applicant poses to Canada on the
other.254 If the factors weigh in favor of the certified person,
removal to the particular country where the danger is feared will
be stayed.2 55 The risk assessment proceeding may or may not
involve a hearing depending on the Minister's "opinion" of the
2 56
need to conduct a hearing.
D. Australia
258
As a party to the Refugee Convention 25 7 and the Protocol,
Australia has a long history of providing protection to offshore

248. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.

249. See Immigration and Refugee Protection Act § 115(1).
250. See id.
§ 115(2)(b).
251. See id.§ 115(1) (limiting this protection to "a protected person" defined
under section 95 (2)); see also infra notes 252-56 and accompanying text.
252. See Immigration and Refugee Protection Act §§ 112-14.
253. Seeid. § 112(1).
254. See id.
§§ 113(d) (i)-(ii).
255. See id.
§ 114(1)(b).
256. See id.
§ 113(b).
257. Status of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 87
(indicating accession to the convention as ofJanuary 22, 1954).
258. See Status of the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 87
(indicating accession to the additional protocol as of December 13, 1973).
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and onshore refugees. 259 Although Australia allocates the
majority of its protection visas for offshore refugees, 260 the focus
of the discussion of procedures and the substantive criteria here
is limited to the onshore asylum status determination. This focus
is meaningful because the primary concern of this Article is on
the substantive and procedural aspects of the terrorism bar that
261
applies to both instances.
1.

Substantive

The principal Australian legislation defining terrorism is the
2002 Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism Act. 262 This Act
is designed to implement the Suppression of Financing of
Terrorism Convention, to which Australia is a party. 263 Consistent
with the convention, the Act not only defines what constitutes a
"terrorist act," but also what does not. As discussed in the
comparative analysis section below, the Australian Act is unique
in this respect. The definition reads in full:
terrorist act means an action or threat of action where:

259. For a description and assessment of Australia's history of refugee protection,
see CATHERINE DAUVERGNE, HUMANITARIANISM, IDENTITY, AND NATION, MIGRATION
LAWS IN CANADA AND AUSTRALIA 91-96, 136-37 (2005). See also Ratna Kapur, Travel
Plans: Border Crossings and The Rights of TransnationalMigrants, 18 HARv. HUM. RTS. J.
107, 131 (2005) ("The policy toward 'unlawful non-citizens' in Australia has treated the
families of asylum-seekers as though they were criminal and dangerous, reprehensible
for their condition."); Catherine Skulan, Australia'sMandatory Detention of "Unauthorized"
Asylum Seekers: History, Politics and Analysis Under InternationalLaw, 21 GEO. IMMIGR. LJ.
61, 93-103 (2006) (suggesting that some of the measures that Australia has taken over
the years, including mandatory detention and forcible return of some violated its
international obligations under the Refugee Convention); Human Rights Watch, By
available at
Invitation Only: Australian Asylum Policy, at 1 (Dec. 2002),
(making
http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/2002/australia/australial202.pdf
interesting observations relating to measures that Australia took to deter unwanted
arrivals).
260. Penelope Mathew, Current Development: Australia Refugee Protection in the Wake
of the Tampa, 96 A.J.I.L. 661, 662 n.21 (2002) ("Protection visas are the usual way that
Australia meets its obligations under the Refugee Convention .... ").
261. Australia considers the offshore refugees more deserving of protection than
those who manage to reach its shores. For a harsh criticism of this position as an excuse
to mistreat and detain unauthorized entrants, see Kapur, supra note 259, at 126-34.
262. Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism Act, 2002, No. 66 (amending
Criminal Code Act, 1995, No. 12).
263. Status of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing
of Terrorism, supra note 75 (indicating Australia's ratification of the convention as of
September 26, 2002).
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(a) the action falls within subsection (2) and does not
fall within subsection (3); and
(b) the action is done or the threat is made with the
intention of advancing a political, religious or
ideological cause; and
(c) the action is done or the threat is made with the
intention of:
(i) coercing, or influencing by intimidation, the
government of the Commonwealth or a State,
Territory or foreign country; or
(ii) intimidate the public or a section of the
public.
(2) Action falls within this subsection if it:
(a) causes serious harm that is physical harm to a
person; or
(b) causes serious damage to property; or
(c) causes a person's death; or
(d) endangers a person's life, other than the life of the
person taking the action; or
(e) creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the
public or a section of the public; or
(f) seriously interferes with, seriously disrupts, or
destroys, an electronic system...
(3) Action falls within this subsection if it:
(a) is advocacy, protest, dissent or industrial action; and
(b) is not intended:
(i) to cause serious harm that is physical harm to a
person; or
(ii) to cause a person's death; or
(iii) to endanger the life of a person, other than
the person taking the action; or
(iv) to create a serious risk to the health or safety
264
of the public or a section of the public.
264. Criminal Code Act, 1995, § 100.1 (1), amended by Suppression of the Financing
of Terrorism Act. Subsection 3 of the same provision adds: "In this Division: (a) a
reference to any person or property is a reference to any person or property wherever
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The Attorney General of Australia also maintains a list of
terrorist organizations. 265 An organization is listed as a terrorist
organization by regulation or court order if the organization
meets the definition set forth in the Suppression of Terrorism
Act of 2002.266 By far the most interesting and unique
consideration is the relevance that the Act gives to the United
Nations Security Council decision relating to terrorism on a
particular group. The Attorney General should consider the
Security Council's determination.2 67 Moreover, he should have
reasonable grounds to believe that the organization is involved in
terrorism .268
Explaining the reasons why Australia considered the
adoption of the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism
Convention consistent with its laws, the Australian Parliament's
Joint Standing Committee on Treaties made an interesting
observation relating to the fundamental doctrinal dilemma
discussed earlier in this Article:
The Committee raised the possibility that the Convention
could infringe upon the activities of Australians who support
organizations such as the African National Congress ....
These organizations have supported and participated in
armed resistance and were, as a consequence, proscribed as
terrorist organizations by the governments whom they
offered resistance. However, some Australians viewed these
organizations as representing principles of human rights and
social justice against repressive regimes and so supported
them financially as well as in other ways.
The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade gave evidence
to the effect that tolerance in the community has decreased
dramatically for organizations that use violence against
civilians and property to pursue political goals. However:
That does not mean that the political pursuit of human
rights, good governance, the end of oppression and so
situated, within or outside Australia; and (b) a reference to the public includes a
reference to the public of a country other than Australia." Id. § 100.1(3).
265. See Australian National Security-Listing of Terrorist Organisations (Dec. 15,
2009),
http://www.ag.gov.au/agd/www/nationalsecurity.nsf/page/
what-governments-are-doinglisting._of.terrorism-organisations.
266. Criminal Code Act, 1995, § 102.1 (1), amended by Suppression of the Financing
of Terrorism Act.
267. See Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2002, c. 5, § 102.1(3).
268. Id.
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on are not just as vigorous in the international arena
... it means that using violence against civilians as a
tool for such a campaign will not be tolerated in any
circumstances.
A further insurance of the civil liberties of Australians to
support regimes proscribed as terrorist in other countries
that may not be proscribed in Australia is the requirement
that a person or organization must show to have intended
that their contributions would be used to finance terrorist
acts.

26 9

This shifts the burden to the government to prove that the
individual acted with the knowledge that the contribution will be
used for committing terrorist acts. This statement is consistent
with the language of article 2 of the Suppression of the Financing
270
of Terrorism Convention.
Finally, Australia has a public safety exception in addition to
national security bar contained in the Refugee Convention.
Either one of these exclusionary grounds may be invoked
271
independently or cumulatively.
2.

Procedural

The principal domestic Australian immigration legislation is
the Migration Act of 1958.272 The Act incorporates the inclusion
and exclusion criteria of the Refugee Convention in their
entirety by reference. 273 The Australian administrative body
entrusted with the task of administering the immigration laws is
the Department of Immigration and Citizenship ("DIC").274 As

269. JOINT STANDING COMM. ON TREATIES, REPORT 47: TREATIES TABLED ON 18 AND

25 JUNE 2002, at 30-31
(2002)
(Austl.)
(citation omitted),
available at
http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/jsct/18_25_june_2002/report/
fullreport.pdf.
270. See International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of
Terrorism, supranote 72, art. 2.
271. See Savitri Taylor, Guardingthe Enemy from Oppression:Asylum-Seekers Rights PostSeptember 11, 26 MELB. U. L. REv. 396, 409-11, 415-16 (2002).
272. Migration Act, 1958, No. 62.
273. See id. § 36(2) ("A criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the
visa is: (a) a non-citizen of Australia to whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has
protection obligations under the Refugee Convention as amended by the Refugee
Protocol..."); see also §§ 91R, 91S, 91T.
274. See NAT'L COMMC'NS BRANCH, DEP'T OF IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP, FACT
SHEET
61-SEEKING
ASYLUM
WITHIN
AUSTRALIA
(2008),
available
at
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delegates of the Minister of Immigration and Citizenship, officers
within the DIC adjudicate asylum or protection applications. 275 In
adjudicating these claims, they consider security assessments
from the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation
("ASIO"). 276 Interestingly, the adjudicating officers do not have
access to the security assessment files, and must take the adverse
security determination of the ASIO at face value in adjudicating
the asylum claim. 277 Moreover, as indicated above, Australia has a
public safety exception, which may be invoked independently. 278
Ordinarily, denials by the DIC officers may be appealed to one of
two appellate bodies called the Refugee Review Tribunal
("RRT") 279 and the Administrative Appeals Tribunal ("AAT"), 280
respectively. A denial based on terrorism or other security-related
grounds must be appealed to the AAT. 281 The Minister maintains
the authority to reverse decisions of these tribunals at any time. 282
He may also personally certify a claimant excludable on security
grounds if he deems it necessary because of the importance of
the case. 283 There is no meaningful judicial review of these
284

administrative decisions.
The Sultan case demonstrates the nature of Australia's
exclusion process concerning national security issues.2 85 Sultan, a
Kuwaiti asylum seeker, was denied asylum on the basis of an

http://www.immi.gov.au/media/fact-sheets/61asylum.htm (providing information on
the Department of Immigration and Citizenship and its responsibilities).
275. See Migration Act § 65.
276. See Taylor, supra note 271, at 410-11.
277. Id. It appears that the adjudicating officers are not given access to the details
of the security assessment. All they receive is notice that the security assessment is
adverse. Id. In fact, Professor Taylor of La Trobe University in Australia, concludes that
"since the entire screening process is the opposite of transparent, it cannot be ruled out
that asylum-seekers in respect of whom there are security concerns will simply be
'screened out' and removed without ever being given an opportunity to make a
protection visa application." Id. at 400.
278. See id. at 409-11, 415-16.
279. See Migration Act § 500(4).
280. See id. § 500(1)-(4).
281. See id. § 500(1)(c).
282. See id. § 417.
283. See id. § 502.
284. See id. § 474(1)-(3).
285. See Dir. Gen. Sec. v. Sultan (1998) 90 F.C.R. 334, 335; see also Taylor, supra
note 271, at 411-12 (discussing the Sultan case and particularly highlighting the errors
of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation).
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adverse security assessment by the ASIO. 286 The nature and
content of the adverse security assessment was disclosed to
neither Mr. Sultan nor his attorneys. 287 The asylum procedures
described above do not provide an opportunity to challenge the
adverse security assessments. In most instances, they remain
unchallenged and the refugees are inevitably deported. In this
particular case, however, Sultan's representatives lodged an
extraordinary administrative complaint unrelated to the asylum
process and discovered that the information that the ASIO relied
on for its adverse security assessment was utterly flawed. 288 The
information was obtained from security services of other nations,
but it was uncorroborated, internally inconsistent, and lacked
credibility given the human rights record of the authorities
supplying the information. 289 After the internal administrative
reviews revealed these defects, Mr. Sultan was allowed to seek
asylum anew and succeeded.2 90
III. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
For Plato, studying the laws of even "ill-ordered cities" was
so beneficial to the Athenian democracy that he used to send
mature members of the Athenian citizenry to different cities for
this purpose. 29 1 Aristotle himself engaged in comparative studies
of the constitutions of the various city-states of Greece as far back
as 350 B.C.E. 292 Throughout history, comparative perspectives
have helped refine the contours of law and legal institutions in
many ways than one. As this and Part IV of this Article
demonstrate, a closer look at the various ways that nations resolve
common problems could easily increase the benefits of
perspectives and wisdoms that may not otherwise be
independently available. Consistent with this view, this part
provides a detailed comparative analysis of the substantive and
procedural laws of the four jurisdictions discussed above,
286. Sultan, 90 F.C.R. at 335.
287. Id. at 335-36.
288. Taylor, supra note 271, at 412 (quoting INSPECTOR-GENERAL OF INTELLIGENCE
AND SECURITY, ANNUAL REPORT 1999-2000 1159 (2000)).

289. Id.
290. Id.
291. See JAMES BECKMAN, COMPARATIVE
SECURITYAND ANTI-TERRORISM ix (2007).

292. See id.
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synthesizes the best practices of all four, and proposes a novel
approach that combines the best aspects of each one of the four
jurisdictions.
A.

Substantive Provisions

The relevant substantive international provisions that are
common to all four jurisdictions are the article 33(2) of the
Refugee Convention 293 and article 2 of the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism Convention. 294 The substantive provisions
of all of the domestic laws are broader than these provisions of
the international conventions. This section provides a detailed
analysis of the domestic provisions of the four jurisdictions vis-Avis the international standards.
1. Some Basic Commonalities
Linked to the conceptual uncertainty surrounding
terrorism, none of the four jurisdictions utilize an uncomplicated
formula that could help adjudicators sort real terrorists from
those that are not. Their basic approach in defining terrorism is
almost identical. All four focus on three levels of involvement:
direct commission of "terrorist acts," defined somewhat
differently in their respective statutes; various degrees of
participation in the commission of the defined acts; and different
levels of association with terrorist groups or organizations, which
they all identify with varying degrees of inclusiveness. Although
they all adhere to the definition set forth under article 2 of the
Convention for the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism, the
individual definitions diverge in some significant ways.
2.

Degree of Approximation to the International Definition of
Terrorism
a. Terrorist Act

The most important subpart of the definition contained in
the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism Convention
defines a "terrorist act" as

293. See supra note 91.
294. See supra note 74.
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[an] act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a
civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in
the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the
purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate
a population, or to compel a government or an international
29
organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.

5

Under this generally agreed definition, many elements
distinguish a terrorist act from other types of violence. The
elements, which need to be met cumulatively, are: (1) intent to
cause death or serious bodily injury, suggesting a specific intent
requirement and limiting the types of injury to death or serious
bodily harm; (2) the victim must be a civilian or a person who
does not take an active part in hostilities, suggesting that attacks
on legitimate military targets may not be considered terrorist
acts; and (3) the purpose of the attack must be to intimidate a
population or compel a government to do or refrain from doing
something. Although the addition of these qualifiers seems to
suggest that there is a consensus on at least those elements, the
reservations submitted by the United States, United Kingdom,
and Canada to Jordan's statement 296 adds some doubt as to the
exact nature of legitimate resistance that may be exempted in the
three jurisdictions. 297 However, there are at least two pieces of
evidence that Australia may exempt the kinds of movements that
Jordan is concerned about from terrorism. The first is simply the
absence of reservation on that particular issue unlike the other
three. The second is the suggestion contained in the report by
Australia's Joint Standing Committee on Treaties. The report
noted that the inclusion of certain acts in the definition of a
terrorist act "does not mean that the political pursuit of human
rights, good governance, the end of oppression and so on are not
just as vigorous in international arena ...

it means that using

violence against civilians as a tool for such a campaign will not be
tolerated in any circumstances."' 298 This clearly limits acts of
terrorism to internationally proscribed conduct, or in other
words, deliberately targeting civilians.

295. International Convention for the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism,

supra note 72, art. 2(1) (b).
296. See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
297. See supra Part I.B.
298. JOINT STANDING COMM. ON TREATIES, supranote 269, at 31.
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The United States seems to have no confusion on this issue,
however. Evidence of that is the clear understanding that it
submitted when it ratified the convention. After vigorously
objecting to Jordan's national armed struggle exemption, the
United States added its own understanding:
(1) EXCLUSION OF LEGITIMATE ACTIVITIES AGAINST
LAWFUL TARGETS. The United States of America
understands that nothing in the Convention precludes any
State Party to the Convention from conducting any legitimate
activity against any lawful target in accordance with the law of
armed conflict.
(2) MEANING OF THE TERM "ARMED CONFLICT". The
United States of America understands that the term "armed
conflict" in Article 2 (1) (b) of the Convention does not
include internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots,
isolated and sporadic acts of violence, and other acts of a
29 9
similar nature.
According to this understanding, the only exemption that the
United States would allow is a military operation by one of the
state parties against legitimate military objectives. That, in effect,
excludes any military operations by nonstate actors even if their
military operations are against legitimate military objectives.
Consistent with this position, the United States is the only one of
the four jurisdictions that does not include the motive and
purpose elements in its definition of terrorist activity for
immigration purposes. The United Kingdom, Canada, and
Australia attempted to approximate their domestic definitions of
"terrorist act" to the international definition by adding
ideological motives and coercive purposes to distinguish terrorist
acts from ordinary violence. 300 Unlike the other three
jurisdictions, the U.S. definition of "terrorist activity" does not
301
contain such qualifications.

299. Depositary Notification-United States of America: Ratification, International
Convention for the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism, U.N. Doc. C/N/697 (2002)
(emphasis added).
300. See supra notes 174-77, 216, 264; see also International Convention for the
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, supra note 72, art. 2(b) (defining terrorist
act as for the ideological purposes and with coercive purposes).
301. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
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Going back to the Saman Kareem Ahmed case, 302 the
terrorist activity that resulted in the denial of immigration
benefits in the United States was his involvement in the Kurdish
resistance movement against the Ba'ath government under
Saddam Hussein. 30 3 Would the other three jurisdictions have
qualified him for asylum? The denial letter states that the
Kurdish Democratic Party ("KDP"), to which Ahmed belonged,
"conducted full-scale armed attacks and helped incite rebellion
against Hussein's regime, most notably the Iran-Iraq war,
Operation Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom." 30 4
The United States is the only one of the four jurisdictions
that does not require a nexus between the terrorist conduct that
disqualifies the claimant and U.S. national security.3 05 In other
words, a U.S. claimant will be excluded even if the act he is
accused of has nothing to do with U.S. national security if the
broad definition is met.30 6 The other three jurisdictions require
some type of nexus between the terrorist act and their respective
nation's national security. For complex jurisprudential reasons,
however, the prospect of Ahmed's success in the other three
jurisdictions is uncertain. Rehman suggests that "there must be a
real possibility of an adverse affect on the United Kingdom for
what is done by the individual under inquiry," but that it does
not have to be "direct or immediate."3 0 7 On the other hand, the
House of Lords gave the administrative officials unreviewable
discretion to determine whether there is any direct or indirect
threat. For example, in Rehman, the Secretary of State for the
Home Department considered the respondent, a Pakistani
national, "not conducive to the public good for reasons of
national security"3 08 because of his involvement in Islamic
organizations in the Indian continent. Although the Secretary
recognized that he posed no direct threat to the United
Kingdom, he was excluded on poorly articulated grounds of
indirect threat. The court deferred to the Secretary's
302. See supra text accompanying notes 113-24.
303. See supra text accompanying notes 113-24.
304. DeYoung, supra note 113.
305. See supra Part II.A.1.
306. But see infra note 341.
307. See Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't v. Rehman [2001] UKHL 47, [16],
[2003] 1 A.C. 153, 182 (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.); supra notes 188-89.
308. See Rehman, [2001] UKHL at [2]-[4].
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determinations without any meaningful scrutiny.30 9 Hence, the
outcome of Ahmed's case in the United Kingdom would depend
on whether the administrative officials, particularly the Secretary
of State for the Home Department, would consider armed
struggle by the Kurdish people against Saddam Hussein as an
indirect threat to the United Kingdom, which is not at all an
inconceivable outcome.
The United Kingdom may also deny asylum to Ahmed on a
separate but related provision. Consistent with the Suppression
of Terrorism Convention, the United Kingdom considers a
person who falls under the definition to have committed acts
contrary to the purpose and principles of the United Nations, an
independent ground of exclusion from asylum under article
1 (F) (c) of the Refugee Convention, which makes up a part of
U.K asylum law. 310 The United Kingdom is the only one of the
four jurisdictions that expressly added this independent ground
3 11
of exclusion in its domestic law.
A similar uncertainty befalls Ahmed in Canada as well. While
the Canadian standard is very similar to the United Kingdom's in
one respect, it is very dissimilar in another. The similarity
pertains to the required nexus between the alleged terrorist
activity and national security. Just like the United Kingdom,
Canada requires a nexus. It is stated in the following terms: "The
matters referred to in subsection (1) [terrorist acts] do not
constitute inadmissibility in respect of a permanent resident or a
foreign national who satisfies the Minister that their presence in
312
Canada would not be detrimental to the national interest."
The commonality does end there. The Canadian Supreme Court,
in Suresh v. Canada, adopted a Rehman-type deference, albeit
qualified in limited ways. The most important part of the ruling
reads:
If the Minister has considered the correct factors, the
courts should not weigh them. Provided the ...
decision is not patently unreasonable-unreasonable
on its face, unsupported by the evidence, or vitiated by

309.
310.
311.
312.

See id at [26].
See Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11, § 54 (U.K.).
See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, 2001 S.C., ch. 27 § 34(2) (Can.).
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failure to consider the proper factors or apply
the
31 3
appropriate procedures-it should be upheld.
This is more or less what could be considered Chevron deference
in the United States. 314 With respect to the substantive
disqualifying factors, Canada's approach is dissimilar. Despite
Canada's objections to Jordan's reservations just like the United
States and United Kingdom,31 5 its Anti-terrorism Act explains that
"for greater certainty," the meaning of a terrorist act:
[D]oes not include an act or omission that is committed
during an armed conflict and that, at the time and in the
place of its commission, is in accordance with customary
international law or conventional international law
applicable to the conflict, or the activities undertaken by
military forces of a state in the exercise of their official
duties .... "316
This paragraph suggests that the mere participation in an armed
conflict by itself does not amount to a terrorist act unless it
violates conventional or customary rules of warfare. Therefore,
Ahmed might prevail in Canada under two alternative theories.
First, he could argue that his conduct does not fall under the
Canadian definition of terrorism because the above quoted
provision suggests that a legitimate armed struggle is exempted.
If he prevails on this argument, the next question would be
whether he violated any rules of warfare by targeting civilians, in
which case he may be considered a terrorist or even a war
criminal. The Canadian authorities would have the burden of
establishing that. Second, Ahmed could prevail under the
national security nexus requirement. 31 7 But again, just like the
United Kingdom, the Canadian Supreme Court in Suresh has
afforded administrative officials almost unreviewable discretion
to make that determination. 318 The outcome thus depends on
whether the Canadian officials consider involvement in KDP an
indirect threat to Canada's national security.

313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.

Suresh v. Canada, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3, 29, 2002 SCC 1, [41].
See supra note 221.
See supra text accompanying notes 82-85.
Anti-terrorism Act, 2001 S.C., ch. 41, § 83.01 (1) (b) (Can.).
See Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, 2001 S.C., ch. 27 § 34(2) (Can.).
See supra Part II.C.1.
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Although Ahmed may face a comparable uncertainty in
Australia because of the independent determination of the nexus
319
between alleged terrorist acts and Australian national security,
he may have a better chance of success there for two reasons.
First, the Australian Joint Standing Committee on Treaties
suggestion that the pursuit of human rights and good
governance may be tolerated unless it involves targeting of
civilians could benefit Mr. Ahmed's claim.3 20 Second, unlike the
other three jurisdictions, Australia's definition of a terrorist act
contains not only acts that are considered terrorist acts, but also
those that are not.32 1 Included among the acts that are not
considered acts of terrorism is "dissent." 322 Although the Act does
not define the nature of this dissent, Ahmed could argue that
dissent in the form of armed struggle must be included. Even
though the decision eventually is up to the Australian
administrative officials to decide whether the admission of
Ahmed is conducive to the national security or interest, just like
the United Kingdom and Canada, Australia seems to be the most
sensitive to the issue of political dissent and national armed
struggle. As such, it might be the best forum for Ahmed to seek
asylum. But, again, this is based exclusively on the substantive
laws. The procedural due process aspect of this issue is discussed
in the following section.
b. Association
Association with a terrorist organization is by far the most
common ground for denial of asylum. What is common to all
four jurisdictions is the proscription approach. Each maintains
their own list of proscribed terrorist organizations. 32 3 They use
more or less the same criteria and that naturally produces a
similar result.3 24 However, a closer look suggests some notable
differences in their approaches.

319. See supra notes 276-78 and accompanying text.
320. See supra note 269 and accompanying text.
321. See supranote 264 and accompanying text.
322. See Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism Act, 2002, No. 66, § 100.1 (2A).
323. See supra text accompanying notes 104, 179-80, 217, 265.
Terrorist
Organizations,
324. See
Wikipedia,
List
of
Designated
(last visited Jan. 24, 2010)
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Terrorist-organization
(comparing the designated organizations by multiple jurisdictions).
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Only the United States has different tiers of terrorist
organizations depending on the procedures of their designation
or proscription. While elaborate substantive and procedural
safeguards are built in to the designation of tier I terrorist
organizations, including possessing the capability to harm U.S.
interest, the authority to designate tier II terrorist organizations
is within the exclusive province of the Secretary of State, who.
should reach the Secretary of Homeland Security and the
Attorney General. 325 Low ranking administrative officials,
including immigration judges, determine tier III terrorist
organizations on an ad hoc basis. 326 The criteria for the
determination of tier III terrorist organizations, however, are
327
extremely broad.
The proscription or designation of terrorist organizations by
the other three jurisdictions is similar to the U.S. tier II
designation process. In the United Kingdom, the Secretary of
State for the Home Department is given a broad authority to
proscribe terrorist organizations. The standard is very low; he or
she only needs to "believe that [the organization] is concerned
in terrorism." 328 Unlike the U.S. tier II designation, there is no
clear consultation obligation. Similarly, in Canada, under the
Anti-terrorism Act, the Governor in Council may designate a
terrorist group based on the recommendations by the Minister of
Public Safety.3 29 Unlike in the United Kingdom, the Canadian
Minister must not only believe that the group is engaged in
terrorist activity, but he should also have reasonable grounds for
the belief.330 Australia allows for procedures similar to the U.S.
tier II and tier III designation process with significant differences
relating to the tier II situation. What may correspond to the tier
II process is Australia's designation by regulation.33 1 Under the
Australian security legislation, the Attorney General may
designate an organization as a terrorist organization if several
requirements are met. 332 What might correspond to the U.S. tier
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.

See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
See Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11, § 3(4) (U.K.).
See Anti-terrorism Act, 2001 S.C., ch. 41, §§ 83.01, 83.05 (Can.).
See id. § 83.5(b).
See Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2002, c. 5, § 102 (Austl.).
See supra notes 265-66.
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III situation is Australia's use of administrative officials for the
determination of whether a certain group is a terrorist
organization or not on a case-by-case basis. To this effect, the Act
reads: "(a) an organization that is directly or indirectly engaged
in, preparing, planning, assisting in or fostering the doing of a
terrorist act (whether or not the terrorist act occurs); or (c) an
organization that is specified by the regulations for the purposes
of this paragraph."3 3 3 The first part of this paragraph suggests
that such determination could be made on a case-by-case basis
just like the U.S. tier III situation. The fundamental distinction
here is that the U.S. tier III groups have broad but specific
meaning. Australia's ad hoc determination must follow the
general definition of acts of terror. In other words, a judge must
determine whether an organization performs terrorist acts as
defined in the statute. The U.S. approach is distinguishable in
the sense that a tier III organization is defined independently of
the definition of a terrorist act, and any association with it could
be grounds for exclusion. A little bit more explanation of this
particular issue is warranted given the importance of the
distinction.
The United States is alone in its tier III approach, which
adds needless complexity and over breadth. A tier III
organization could be a group of two or more persons who cause
damage to property or injury to persons using a dangerous
device. 334 Anyone who associates with this kind of group or who
provides "material support" to this group is considered a
terrorist.335 The most frequent infraction of this provision is the
contribution of money to a humanitarian organization that in
turn helps the humanitarian branch of a tier III type terrorist
33 6
organization.
A very good example demonstrating the over breadth of this
provision is the story of the Iraqi lawyer, Odeh Al Refaiel, who

333. See § 102.1.
334. See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
335. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
336. See, e.g., Eleanor Acer et al., Human Rights First, Abandoning the Persecuted:
from
Asylum
(2006),
of
Terrorism
and
Oppression
Barred
Victims
For
a
http://www.humanrightsfirst.info/pdf/06925-asy-abandon-persecuted.pdf.
detailed analysis of various scenarios relating to the application of tier III terrorist
groups, see Kidane, supranote 121, at 704.
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helped U.S. forces rescue a marine private. 37 It is clear that he
would be excluded under U.S. law because of his association to a
tier III terrorist organization for providing material support to
two or more U.S. soldiers who carried dangerous weapons and
caused damage to property and injury to persons. 338 Unlike
Ahmed, who admitted to committing acts of warfare, Al Refaiel's
exclusion would be based on mere association in the form of
supplying information to a terrorist group. The distinction is
crucial because while Ahmed may be denied asylum under the
laws of all four jurisdictions, U.S. law is the only one that would
exclude Al Refaiel. The reason is that none of the other
jurisdictions have a definition of a terrorist group corresponding
to the U.S. tier III category. Although Australia's ad hoc process
of determining terrorist groups resembles this approach, the
adjudicators there do not use the tier III broad definition of a
terrorist group.33 9 They focus on the question of whether the
organization committed a terrorist act-defined in the statute as
requiring ideological motives and coercive purposes. 340 The
national security nexus requirement in all of the other
jurisdictions casts Al Refaiel in a completely different light.
Assuming Al Refaiel assisted the armed forces of any one of the
three to rescue one of their own, the inquiry would focus on
whether he is a threat to national security and not on whether he
falls under the sweeping definition of terrorism. In that sense,
almost without a doubt all of the other jurisdictions would grant
him asylum. The United States is the exception in this respect
also. 341 Moreover, the United States adds the child and spouse
exclusion category. 342 Assuming Al Refaiel had a child or spouse,
they too would be excluded based on his activities unless they

337. See supranote 122 and accompanying text.
338. See supranotes 123-24 and accompanying text.
339. See supraPart II.D.1.
340. See supraPart II.D.1.
341. The only time a national security nexus is required under the INA is if the
exclusion is because the claimant is a representative of terrorist organization. See
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 212(b)(2)(A)(v), 8 U.S.C. §
1182(b)(2) (A) (v) (2006). This exception for representatives is strange in a situation
where even "endors[ing] and espous[ing] terrorist activity" or even "support" or even
being a spouse or a child of one who espouses or supports would be excluded. See id. §
1182 (a) (3) (B) (i) (VII).
342. See supra note 100.

2010]

THE TERRORISM BAR TO ASYLUM

357

could demonstrate that they could not have known about his aid
343
to U.S. forces, which they cannot do.
In conclusion, it could be said that the substantive definition
of terrorism of the United States is significantly broader than all
of the other jurisdictions because of the addition of the tier III
terrorist group category, the materials support bar linked to this
particular category, the lack of a national security nexus
requirement, and the addition of an independent children and
spouses of terrorists category. The U.S. net is cast so wide that it is
often likely to catch Burmese monks, not real terrorists.
Although none of the jurisdictions are immune from mistakes,
the degree of error that U.S. law produces is undoubtedly much
higher. Perhaps the most conservative approach is that of
Australia because its definition most approximates the
international definition, includes a national security nexus
requirement, and recognizes the different nature of dissent or
national armed struggle to a certain degree. Moreover, Australia
is the only one that did not object to Jordan's reservations which
pointed out that Jordan does not consider armed struggle for
terrorism. 344
as constituting
self-determination
national
Furthermore, Australia has the shortest list of proscribed terrorist
organizations, 345 suggesting a desire to limit the scope of
terrorism-based criminalization and, as such, exclusion from
asylum.
B.

Procedures

The adjudicative procedures are more divergent than the
substantive laws. This section provides a detailed comparative
analysis of the procedural rules of the four jurisdictions.
All four jurisdictions, the United Kingdom to a lesser extent,
have both overseas and domestic refugee or asylum procedures.
Since the overseas programs are purely humanitarian and not a
function of international obligation, 346 the focus of this article
has been exclusively on the domestic asylum processes.

343. See supra note 110.

344. See supranotes 82--85 and accompanying text.
345. See supra note 265.

346. See, e.g., Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 207(b), 8 U.S.C. 1157(b)
(2006).
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Consistent with that trend, the focus here is also limited to the
domestic procedures.
1.

Primary Decision Makers

An application for asylum is initially submitted to low
ranking administrative officials within the respective immigration
department in all four jurisdictions. In the United States, the
primary decision maker could be an immigration officer or an
immigration judge. If the claimant is an arriving alien, meaning a
person who has just arrived and made a claim for asylum, an
immigration officer may order him deported if he "suspects" that
he falls under the terrorism exception. 47 If the claimant is not an
3 48
arriving alien, an immigration judge makes the determination.
In the other three jurisdictions, there is no such bifurcation.
In the United Kingdom, the administrative tribunal that
adjudicates an asylum claim must first consider a certificate by
the Secretary of State for the Home Department. If the certificate
implicates the claimant with terrorism, the tribunal must deny
the claim on terrorism grounds.3 49 Although the United States
also utilizes certification by the Attorney General, 350 it is not the
principal way of adjudicating terrorism related cases. While
Australia does not utilize a certification procedure, the asylum
adjudicators must consider a security report by Australia's
security agency ASIO. 35' In fact, the ASIO determinations are
conclusive. 352 The adjudicators are not even given access to the
details of the security determinations. 353 This is perhaps the worst
system of all because the asylum adjudicators are overridden by
the security agency, which is not required to share information
with the asylum adjudicators or justify its position in any
meaningful way. As indicated in Part II.D.2 above, it is most liable
for abuse. Canada's approach is similar to Australia's in that
distinct authorities consider the security and asylum claims
separately. However, it has its own peculiarities. Once the claim is
submitted, administrative officials prescreen the case for grounds
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.

See supra notes 144-47 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 133-36 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 191-92 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 137-40 and accompanying text.
See supra note 276 and accompanying text.
See supra note 277 and accompanying text.
See supra note 277 and accompanying text.
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of inadmissibility independently of the merits of the case. 354 A
separate administrative body adjudicates the grounds of
inadmissibility, in this case terrorism, independently of the
asylum claim which is usually adjudicated by the regular process
before the Immigration and Refugee Board ("IRB"). 355 If the
claimant falls under the terrorism exception, he would be
precluded from having his asylum claim reviewed and put
through an independent and separate certification and
deportation process. 356 In what appears to be a measure of
compliance with the principle of nonrefoulement, Canada has a
unique procedure called "Pre-removal Risk Assessment." 35 7 This
is a completely discretionary procedure designed to weigh the
risk to national security that the claimant poses, and the severity
of the danger the claimant may face upon deportation. 358 The
359
proceeding may or may not be accompanied by a hearing.
Although discretionary, this last resort procedure is perhaps the
best safety net that any one of the four jurisdictions puts in place.
Significantly, it gives the authorities the chance to balance the
seriousness of the national security risk with the likelihood and
severity of the persecution that the claimant would face. None of
the other three jurisdictions has this kind of last resort protection
against refoulement. In fact, the United States, for example, is
explicit in its rejection of this kind of process and as such there is
no opportunity for the balancing of the danger to national
360
security with the risk to the individual.

354. See supra note 236 and accompanying text.
355. See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
356. See supra notes 242-47 and accompanying text.
357. See supranotes 252-56 and accompanying text..
358. See supra note 254 and accompanying text.
359. See supra note 256 and accompanying text.
360. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 242(b)(3)(B), 8 U.S.C. §
1252(b) (3) (B) (2006) (providing that the principle of nonrefoulement or withholding
of removal does not apply to a person falling under section 237 (a) (4) (B), which the
terrorism bar provision). As State Parties to the Convention Against Torture, all
jurisdictions theoretically observe the principle of nonrefoulement, which makes no
exception for terrorists. See Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 3, Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-22,
1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
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Administrative Appeals

The administrative appeals processes have some significant
differences. In the United States, an arriving alien ordered
removed by an immigration officer on suspicion of terrorism may
have his case reviewed by the Attorney General. 361 If the Attorney
General agrees with the officer, the case ends there-there are
no more avenues of administrative or other appeals. 62 In
ordinary cases not involving an arriving alien, the immigration
judge's decision may be appealed to the BIA, which will look at
the merits of the decision, including whether the claimant falls
under the terrorism exception. 363 The Canadian bifurcated
system adds another layer of complexity because the exception
must be adjudicated separately from the main claim. There is no
meaningful administrative appeal on the initial finding of
terrorism because the separate procedure leads to a certification
and removal process. 364 Certification is made jointly by the
Immigration and Public Safety ministers.3 65 A federal court may
review it only for reasonableness.3 66 Because the security process
is separate from the merits of the asylum claim, the Canadian
authorities deprive themselves of an important perspective that
they could have obtained by hearing the merits of the claim and
having an understanding of the totality of the circumstances. The
Canadian approach seems to be deficient in this respect.
Australia and the United Kingdom have separate appeals
tribunals for terrorism-related cases. In Australia, the AAT
reviews the decisions of the DIC.3 67 The Minister maintains the
authority to reverse the AAT's decision, 368 just like the Attorney
General may reverse the BIA's decision in the United States. 369
The United Kingdom has the best administrative review process
primarily because the administrative appeals body, the SIAC, is a
quasijudicial body with three members who should have diverse
but complementing expertise-currently there is one with
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.

See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
See supranote 242-247 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 243 and accompanying text.
See supranotes 244-47 and accompanying text.
See supra note 281 and accompanying text.
See supranote 282 and accompanying text.
See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
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security expertise, one with asylum law expertise, and another
one with experience in a high judicial office. 370 A close reading of
the decisions by this tribunal clearly shows the maturity of the
371
panel.
3. Judicial Review
In the United States all questions of law are ordinarily
reviewable by the Court of Appeals after a final removal order is
rendered. 372 A removal order based on the terrorism bar is,
however, expressly precluded from judicial review. 373 In this
respect the law is unequivocal; it provides: "There shall be no
judicial review of a determination of the Attorney General under
subparagraph (A) (v) [which is the terrorism bar.] " 374 This means
that an asylum denial by the BLA based on the terrorism grounds
is effectively final and unreviewable. A conflicting INA provision
seems to suggest that constitutional claims and other questions of
law still might be reviewable. 75 Australia's preclusion of judicial
review of administrative decisions involving the terrorism bar is
even more sweeping. The Australian law reads:
A privative clause decision [almost any administrative
decision made under the Act], (a) is final and conclusive;
and (b) must not be challenged, appealed against, reviewed,
quashed or called in question in any court; and (c) is not
subject to prohibition, mandamus, injunction, declaration or
3 76
certiorari in any court on any account.
Despite this sweeping language, just like the United States, it is
suggested that constitutional claims and other questions of law
377
still may be reviewable.

370.
371.
372.
373.
374.

See supra note
See supra note
See supra note
See supra note
Immigration

199 and accompanying text.
201 and accompanying text.
131; see also supra notes 136, 142, 159 and accompanying text.
132 and accompanying text.
and Nationality Act of 1952 § 208(b) (2) (D), 8 U.S.C. §

1158(b) (2) (D) (2006).
375. See 8 U.S.C. § § 1252(a) (2) (D). There is an apparent inconsistency between
this provision and the bar for the terrorism exception. Compare id., with 8 U.S.C. §
1158(b) (2)(D).
376. See Migration Act, 1958, No. 62, § 474(1).
377. See Taylor, supra note 271, at 409 (suggesting that although some of the
decisions may be challenged on constitutional grounds, there is not any meaningful
judicial review of the administrative decisions).
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There is no express preclusion of judicial review in the
United Kingdom or Canada, however, and the standards of
review are very deferential. The extent of the deference is
difficult to measure based exclusively on statutory or judicial
language. It appears, however, that they are in the Chevron-genre
in the U.S. context. The U.S. Supreme Court in Chevron v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.3 78 articulated what has
become to be known as Chevron deference. In that case, the
Court held that courts must defer to the interpretations of the
administrative agency entrusted with the task of interpreting a
statute as long as the statute is ambiguous and the interpretation
is reasonable.3 7 9 The agency's interpretation must be upheld even
if the court would have chosen a different interpretation. 380 The
U.K and Canadian standards of review approximate Chevron.
In the United Kingdom, the SLAC, the specialized tribunal
that reviews appeals from denials of asylum based on terrorism
bar, is quasi-judicial; however, its decisions may be judicially
reviewed. 381 The Chevron-type standard of deference could be
gleaned from the following statement of Lord Hoffmann of the
U.K House of Lords in the Rehman case:
[I]n matters of national of national security, the cost of
failure can be high. This seems to me to underline the need
for the judicial arm of government to respect the decisions
of ministers of the Crown on the question of whether
support for terrorist activities in a foreign country constitutes
38 2
a threat to national security.
The court further noted that the Secretary of State for the Home
Department is in the best position to weigh the danger that the
admission of a refugee may present based on information at his
383
disposal, and as such, his decisions must be given deference.
The Canadian Supreme Court's articulation of the deference is
identical with that of the U.K House of Lords. In fact, the

378.
379.
380.
381.
382.
A.C. 153,
383.

467 U.S. 837 (1984).
See id. at 844.
See id.
See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't v. Rehman, [2001] UKHL 47, [62], [2003] 1
195 (appeal taken from Eng.) (Hoffman, L.J.).
Id. at [26].
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Canadian Supreme Court relied on the same language as in
384
Rehman to reach that conclusion.
What is most interesting is that the U.S. Congress designed
what could perhaps be the best system ofjudicial intervention in
these and related issues when it enacted the provisions relating to
the establishment of the ATRC, which has not yet been
installed.38 5 Although there is some similarity between the ATRC
and the United Kingdom's SIAC, their differences are
fundamental. In fact, a procedural structure that combines the
two might be the best system yet.
C.

Identifying a Model

The principal objective of the forgoing discussions has been
to evaluate the strengths and shortcomings of the domestic
antiterrorism laws of the four jurisdictions, in particular the
provisions relating to the terrorism bar to asylum, in a
comparative perspective. The discussions suggest that although
the laws are designed to solve the same kinds of challenges and
have identical international underpinnings, the differences in
the various approaches are quite remarkable. None of the four
approaches is without significant flaws. What is most interesting,
however, is that a closer look reveals that each one has unique
and exemplary approaches in some discrete areas that benefit
the others. This section synthesizes the best practices of each and
proposes an approach that combines these best practices.
1.

Refining the Substantive Scope

The insurmountable challenge is defining terrorism in such
a way that it covers only those who are considered either
undeserving of protection or dangerous to the host nation.
Identifying the undeserving terrorist is relatively easy as the
inquiry pertains to the gravity of prior acts such as war crimes.
Much of the controversy relates to the extent of the relationship
between prior acts of a noncriminal nature, including association
and national security. There is always a risk associated with the
admission of every single refugee. However, the system of law is
384. See Suresh v. Canada, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3, 2002 SCC 1, [33] (quoting Rehman,
[2001] UKHL at [62] (Hoffman, LJ.).
385. See supraPart II.A.2.
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supposed to be designed to make a sound judgment that
balances the risk with the humanitarian objectives. A look back to
history suggests that since World War II, millions of refugees have
gained protection in these four nations alone, however, to date, a
single refugee is yet to be implicated in real terrorist attacks of
the host community. 386 All of the recent laws that have been
discussed above have lost any reasonable sense of proportion. An
excellent description of this kind of sense of proportion is
contained in a dissenting opinion written by Judge Johnnie C.
Rawlinson of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Cheema v.
Ashcroft.3 87 In this case, he opined that no kind of resistance could
be ignored as irrelevant for U.S. national security no matter how
remote it might seem. 38 8 To support his conclusion, he cited to
the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand on June 28, 1914,
in Sarajevo as the event that was responsible for the start of
World War 1.389 This rationale obviously did not impress the
majority of his colleagues. The majority of the court rejected the
idea that every militant activity that occurs around the world
threatens U.S. national security and emphasized the need for
some sense of proportionality.3 9 0 Although Cheema is largely
irrelevant, as it was decided under prior law and involved other
issues, it injected some sense of proportionality to the debate. To
this effect the court noted the example:
That terrorist activity affecting a country struggling with
strife cannot be equated automatically with an impact on the
security of the United States is dramatically illustrated by the
case of Nelson Mandela. In 1961, Mandela organized a
paramilitary branch of the African National Congress,
Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) or "Spear of the Nation," to
conduct guerrilla warfare against the ruling white
government. He then went into hiding to carry out the MK's
mission: "to make government impossible," and began
arranging for key leaders and their volunteers to go abroad
for training in guerrilla warfare. Mandela was convicted by
Dec.
19,
2006,
ToMPAINE.coM,
Refugee
or
Terrorist?,
386. E.g.,
http://www.tompaine.com/articles/2006/12/19/refugee-or-terrorist.php ("No known
terrorist has ever entered the United States through the refugee program, largely
because of its stringent screening process ... .
387. 383 F.3d 848 (9th Cir. 2004).
388. Id. at 860.
389. Id.
390. Id. at 858.
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the South African government of treason in 1964 and
sentenced to life in prison. In 1986, Congress passed the
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act, stating that its goal was
to pressure the South African government to release Nelson
Mandela from prison. It would not be sensible to conclude
that Congress, in aiding a man convicted of treason by his
own government, endangered the security of the United
States or that the alien supporters of Mandela in this country
were all deportable as terrorists endangering our national
1
security.

39

As discussed above, that is the current state of the law of
almost all of the four jurisdictions discussed above, perhaps with
the exception of Australia. As such, a modified version of
Australia's approach in defining terrorism might instill some
sense to the substantive scope of the terrorism definition.
Australia's approach is unique and better in many ways: (1) its
lack of reservations on Jordan's position that national armed
struggle for self-determination does not constitute terrorism
suggests that its definition of terrorist act must be read in light of
this understanding; 392 (2) the Standing Committee for Treaties
expressly stated that support for political dissent does not
constitute support for terrorism;3 93 and (3) the definition itself
uniquely and expressly carves out acts that are not considered
terrorist acts. 394 It is necessary to reemphasize that particular
provision here. It provides that an action or a threat of action
does not fall within the meaning of a terrorist act if it:
(a) is advocacy, protest, dissent or industrial action; and
(b) is not intended:
(i) to cause serious harm that is physical harm to a
person; or
(ii) to cause a person's death; or
(iii) to endanger the life of a person, other than the
person taking the action; or

391.
392.
393.
394.

Id. at 858-59 (citation omitted).
See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
See supra note 269 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 261-62 and accompanying text.
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(iv) to create a serious risk to the health or safety of the
395
public or a section of the public.
Mandela may have a chance of winning asylum under this
Australian law because the actions he took could be classified as
dissent that is not at all intended to cause a person's death or
physical harm to a person or create a serious risk to the health
and safety of the public. According to Mandela, as cited by the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Cheema, his objective was to
make the apartheid government "impossible."'3 96 His choice to
avoid targeting persons is categorical as a matter of fact and
principle. His admission of targeting infrastructure using
dynamite is a matter of record. 397 As such, his dissent involved the
use of force against property but not persons. The Australian law
is remarkable in its exclusion of damage to property from the
definition of a terrorist act. 398 That particular omission would
enable the likes of Mandela to win asylum. In that sense, the
Australian definition is perhaps the most sensible and workable
definition of terrorism, which all the others could use to avoid
absurd results like the exclusion Nelson Mandela on terrorism
grounds.
The trickier question is whether legitimate military
resistance against a tyrannical regime must invariably be
considered a terrorist act as it inevitably involves the use of force
against persons, at least the regime's soldiers. An even trickier,
perhaps impossible, question is what kinds of regimes deserve
armed resistance. According to renowned international jurist,
Antonio Cassese, armed resistance is justifiable under
international law only in three circumstances: "to resist the
forcible denial of self-determination by (1) a colonial state, (2)
an occupying power, or (3) a state refusing a racial group equal
access to government." 399 His critics are acrimonious. They argue
that if the legitimacy of armed resistance is confined to these
three qualifiers, German Jews, for example, would have no right
of self-defense against Hitler's government because they belong
395. Criminal Code Act, 1995, No. 12, § 100.1 (1), amended by Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism Act, 2002, No. 66 (Austl.).
396. See Cheema, 383 F.3d at 858.
397. See supra note 29-31 and accompanying text.
398. See supranote 264 and accompanying text.
399. See SMALL ARMS SURVEY 2004: RIGHTS AT RISK, supra note 38 (quoting Cassese,
supra note 38).
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to the same racial group and there was obviously no colonial
occupation. 40 0 These two positions seem irreconcilable, but are
fairly representative. Recognizing the difficulty demonstrated by
these diverging lines of argument, Professor Bassiouni's several
decades-old definition of terrorism discussed in Part I.B above,
may help the international community's decade old, ongoing but
unsuccessful effort of defining terrorism. To reiterate, Professor
Bassiouni's definition of terrorism reads:
An ideologically-motivated strategy of internationally
proscribed violence designed to inspire terror within a
particular segment of a given society in order to achieve a
power-outcome or to propagandize a claim or grievance
for and on
acting
irrespective of whether its perpetrators are 40
1
behalf of themselves or on behalf of a state.
The key, of course, is an internationally proscribed conduct.
Professor Bassiouni discusses this in light of proscriptions of
conduct under international humanitarian law-mainly the
prohibition of targeting civilians regardless of how legitimate the
use of force may be. 40 2 The concept of internationally proscribed
conduct itself begs the question that Cassese and his critics
address, but predicating the definition on centuries-old
customary and conventional international law would seem to
have no better alternative.
What makes the most sense is a case-by-case determination
of whether, regardless of the elements of some kind of definition
of terrorism, the asylum-seeker poses a real threat to the national
security of the receiving state. The United Kingdom, Canada and
Australia resolve the impossible dilemma that is inherent in the
definition of terrorism by requiring a nexus between the alleged
terrorist acts with their national security. The United States does
not require this nexus. That will continue to lead to utterly
absurd results as in the case of Ahmed and Al Refaiel.
For those jurisdictions that require the link, the challenge is
ensuring procedural due process. The following section looks at
this issue.

400. See supra note 42.
401. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 17, at xxiii.
402. See iL
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Ensuring Procedural Due Process

None of the procedures of the four jurisdictions discussed in
the previous sections independently provides a system that would
endure appropriate levels of procedural due process. Fairness of
the asylum procedures in all four jurisdictions is undoubtedly
undermined by the relegation of the important decisions to lowranking administrative officials, flawed administrative appeals
processes, the use of confidential evidence, lack of meaningful
representation, the complexity of the laws, and the absence of
meaningful judicial oversight.
Each one of the four countries, except perhaps Australia,
however, has a valuable and unique procedural approach that
could inure to the benefit of each jurisdiction. Australia's
procedures deny the asylum adjudicators access to the security or
ASIO files. 40 3 On account of that alone, the procedures are
deficient from the outset. Moreover, this flaw cannot be
remedied through a judicial process because Australia's
40 4
preclusion of judicial review is unequivocal and categorical.
Although the use of confidential evidence is also possible in the
other jurisdictions, the complete and unchallengeable security
veto is unique to Australia.40 5 Canada's bifurcation of the
inadmissibility adjudication, including security grounds, and the
adjudication of the merits of an asylum application seem to
produce a similar result as Australia's independent security
override; however, Canada has a last resort remedial measure
called the "pre-removal risk assessment procedure," which
distinguishes its system from Australia. 4 6 The Canadian preremoval risk assessment procedure could be noted as exemplary
in this respect.
The United Kingdom's unique and interesting procedural
addition is the composition of the administrative appellate review
body known as the Special Immigration Appeals Commission. As
indicated above, the SICA seems to be a quasi-judicial body
because of its jurisdiction and composition. The jurisdiction is
limited to security related cases, 40 7 which makes it remarkably
403.
404.
405.
406.
407.

See supra note 277 and accompanying text.
See supra note 284 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 282-83 and accompanying text.
See supra 252-56 and accompanying text.
See supra 197 and accompanying text.
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specialized, and the three members combine relevant and
complementary backgrounds. 408 Moreover, this body has
elaborate and reasonable rules of procedure. This could be a
good intermediate appellate body, which could enable all of the
jurisdictions to provide reasonable levels of procedural due
process.
As indicated in Part II.A.2 above, the United States has an
excellent system in its books that to date is yet to be used-the
ATRC. If installed with minor modifications, the ATRC could
undoubtedly be the best system of all with the potential of
enduring minimum levels of procedural due process. The ATRC
is a specialized Article III court 4°9 with limited jurisdiction to
adjudicate terrorism related removal cases. 4 10 Although it has its
unique approaches to procedural due process, it naturally comes
411
with all the inherent benefits of access to an Article III court.
These procedural guarantees bring some sense to the
adjudication of security-related cases in the United States.
Although the ATRC has unfortunately not been set up yet, all of
the jurisdictions could benefit by adopting a similar approach to
ensure reasonable levels of procedural due process. The
important modifications that the ATRC might require would be
the extension of its mandate to all cases triggering the terrorism
bar to asylum, and the addition of jurisdiction to grant asylum
and other forms of relief from deportation. 412 Reconstituted this
way, the ATRC would be the best option available.
Since denial of asylum on grounds of terrorism is a serious
allegation with dramatic consequences, carefully crafted
procedural guarantees are essential. As such, a reasonably
efficient but considerate system would utilize the United
Kingdom's SICA as a primary decision maker, and the United
States' ATRC as an appellate body, and additional layer of
guarantee against sending refugees back to persecution by
including Canada's pre-removal risk assessment procedure in the
408. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
409. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
410. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
411. See supra notes 152-62 and accompanying text.
412. In its current shape, its jurisdiction does not extend to all cases (e.g. arriving
aliens seeking asylum would have no access to the court), and it does not have the
jurisdiction to grant asylum. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 504(k), 8
U.S.C. § 1534(k) (2006).
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event of negative determinations by the ATRC. This may be
adopted without precluding the reviewability of constitutional
and other questions of law by appellate courts.
CONCLUSION
Aspirations of cultural tolerance and convergence, and
ambitions of civilized interaction, suffered a serious setback on
September 11, 2001. Aspirations were replaced with fear, anger,
resentment, and passion. This Article performed a sobriety test
on the laws drafted with under this influence. The result is clear:
they all fail not only as measured by standards of the traditional
notions of fair play, but also in their capacity to achieve their
stated objectives. Without a doubt nearly one hundred percent of
persons rejected under the anti-terrorism provisions are neither
real terrorists nor undeserving of protection. These laws are
failures and must be amended. Criminalizing political dissent
undercuts the very essence and foundation of the refugee law. As
one observer has put it:
It's a case of "damned if you do; damned if you don't"-an
asylum-seeker who claims support or membership of a listed
group risks arrest, and one who disavows support for the
group will have the claim rejected on the ground that he or
413
she is not persecuted at home.
In relation to this, the opinion of the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Cheema v. Ashcroft is very instructive:
At least since 1848, the year of democratic revolutions in
Europe, the United States has been a hotbed of sympathy for
revolution in other lands, often with emigres to this country
organizing moral and material support for their countrymen
oppressed by European empires such as those of Austria,
Britain and Russia. In the twentieth century, active
revolutionaries such as De Valera and Ben Gurion worked in
the United States for the liberation of their homelands.
More recently, foreign anti-Communists living in the United
States were active in encouraging and aiding movements
against Communist tyranny in the Soviet Union and China.
Much of this revolutionary activity would fall under the
definition of terrorist activity as the Board interprets the
statute. None of it had consequences for the lives and
413. The TerrorismAct-Embracing Tyranny, supranote 183.
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property of American citizens or the national defense, and
the slight strains occasionally put on our foreign relations
were more than offset by the reputation earned by the
United States as a continuing cradle for liberty in other parts
of the world.

414

The fundamental notion of the court's opinion in the U.S.
context is equally applicable to the other jurisdictions, all of
which had a great history of protection of refugees. If the
terrorism bar as currently reconstituted in the domestic laws of
Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States
continues to be applied without reasonable restrictions on the
scope of the substantive definition and the procedural
guarantees along the lines described above, international refugee
law will soon be history, at least for those who think persecution
for resisting tyranny would entitle them to protection. Until such
time that another wave of amendments to these laws substantially
improves their fairness, asylum-seekers around the world must be
seriously warned that the Western world's tolerance for political
resistance against tyranny has grown remarkably smaller.

414. Cheema v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 848, 858 (9th Cir. 2004).

